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1 The problem
We give here a polynomial-time algorithm which distinguishes a permuted (U,U + V )-code from
a random linear code of the same length and dimension. This invalidates one of the security as-
sumptions of the security proof of SURF. Our algorithms is based on the fact that for the SURF
parameters the hull of a permuted (U,U + V )-code is typically much bigger than that is expected
for random linear codes of the same length and dimension. Let us start by some definitions and
notation.
Notation. Vectors will be written with bold letters (such as x). The i-th component of x is
denoted by xi. When x and y are two vectors, (x,y) denotes their concatenation. A binary linear
code of length n and dimension k is referred to as an [n, k]-code.
Definitions. Let C be an [n, k]-code. We now define its hull as:
hull(C)4= C ∩ C⊥
where C⊥ denotes its dual which is defined as:
C⊥ = {h ∈ Fn2 : ∀c ∈ C, 〈c,h〉 = 0}.
The scalar product 〈c,h〉 is performed here over F2. Moreover, if pi is a permutation of length n
we define:
pi(C)4={pi(c) : c ∈ C} where pi(c) = (cpi(i))1≤i≤n.
Let U, V be binary linear codes of length n/2 and respective dimension kU , kV . We define the
subset of Fn2 :
(U,U + V )
4
={(u,u + v) : u ∈ U and v ∈ V }
which is a linear code of length n and dimension kU + kV . Public keys of SURF are pi(U,U + V )
codes where both U and V have been chosen uniformly at random among the [n/2, kU ],[n/2, kV ]-
codes and pi is a random permutation of length n. Let us denote by Dpub this distribution and by
Drand the distribution of [n, kU + kV ]-codes chosen uniformly at random.
? This work was supported in part by the Commission of the European Communities through the Horizon
2020 program under project number 645622 PQCRYPTO.
ar
X
iv
:1
70
6.
08
06
5v
4 
 [c
s.C
R]
  3
0 N
ov
 20
17
2 Thomas Debris-Alazard, Nicolas Sendrier, and Jean-Pierre Tillich
The security reduction of SURF relies on the difficulty to distinguish Dpub and Drand. The algo-
rithm we are going to give performs for the SURF parameters in polynomial-time this task with
a success probability 1− ε where ε is a negligible function in n.
It consists in computing the hull of the permuted (U,U + V )-code and decide that the code
belongs to Dpub if and only if the dimension is kU − kV and to Drand otherwise. It is readily seen
that the hull can be computed in polynomial time.
The reason explaining the correction of this algorithm is given by the two following propositions.
Proposition 1 ([Sen97]). The expected dimension of the hull of a random linear code is O(1).
It is smaller than t with probability ≥ 1−O(2−t).
Proposition 2. Assume that kU ≥ kV . If C is picked according to the distribution Dpub we have
with probability 1−O(2kV −kU )
dim (hull(C)) = kU − kV .
The correction of our attack easily follows from these two propositions.
Proof (Sketch of the proof of Proposition 1). Without loss of generality we are going to show that
with probability 1 − O(2kV −kU ) we have dim(hull(U,U + V )) = kU − kV as the hull is invariant
by permuting the code positions. It is readily seen that
(U,U + V )⊥ = (V ⊥ + U⊥, V ⊥).
This implies that
hull((U,U + V )) = (U,U + V ) ∩ (U⊥ + V ⊥, V ⊥).
Therefore for any vector (u,u+v) ∈ hull((U,U+V )) where u ∈ U and v ∈ V there exists v ∈ V ⊥
and u⊥ ∈ U⊥ such that {
u = v⊥ + u⊥
u + v = v⊥
⇐⇒
{
v = u⊥
u + v = v⊥
In this way, the vector v lives in V ∩ U⊥. But we remark that
dim(V ) + dim(U⊥) = kV + n/2− kU = n/2 + kV − kU < n/2.
This can be used to prove that with probability 1 − O(2kV −kU ) we have V ∩ U⊥ = {0} and
v = u⊥ = 0. It follows that vectors of hull(U,U + V ) are with high probability of the form (x,x)
where x ∈ U ∩ V ⊥. Once again we remark that:
dim(U) + dim(V ⊥) = kU + n/2− kV = n/2 + kU − kV > n/2.
This can be used to prove that with probability 1−O(2kV −kU ) we have
dim(U ∩ V ⊥) = kU − kV .
This discussion implies that with probability 1−O(2kV −kU ) we have
dim(hull((U,U + V ))) = dim(U ∩ V ⊥) = kU − kV .
This gives with a high probability a hull of dimension kU − kV . This concludes the proof.
Discussion
Bootstrapping from here. This algorithm does not only invalidate our security proof, it can
also be used to mount an attack. It starts by noticing that vectors in the hull are of the form
pi(u,u) where u ∈ U ∩ V ⊥. This yields partial information on pi which leads to a feasible attack
on the parameters proposed for the SURF scheme.
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On the condition kU ≥ kV . What makes the attack feasible is the fact that kU ≥ kV . This
condition is necessary for our signature scheme to work (this is essentially a consequence of Propo-
sition 3 in the old paper). It is precisely this condition that enables to produce for any possible
syndrome an error of a sufficiently low weight that an attacker who does not know the (U,U +V )
structure has a hard time to produce. The distinguisher does not work anymore in the regime
where kU < kV . However in this case our signature scheme does not work anymore.
On the NP-completeness of the distinguishing problem. Interestingly enough, the NP-
completeness of Problem 5 (namely Problem P2’: weak (U,U + V ) distinguishing) works for pa-
rameters that really correspond to the case kU < kV . The same holds for another proof we have
on the NP-completeness of the (U,U + V ) distinguishing problem itself, namely
Problem 1. ( (U,U + V )-distinguishing)
Instance: A binary linear code C and an integer kU ,
Question: Is there a permutation pi of length n such that pi(C) is a (U,U + V )-code
where dim(U) = kU and |Supp(V )| = n/2?
The NP-completeness of this problem is given in the old version in the appendix in Subsection
C.3. The reduction to three dimensional matching is also in the regime where kU < kV .
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The old version of the paper
starts here.
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Abstract. We present here a new code-based digital signature scheme. This scheme uses
(U,U + V ) codes where both U and V are random. We show that the distribution of sig-
natures is uniform by suitable rejection sampling. This is one of the key ingredients for our
proof that the scheme achieves existential unforgeability under adaptive chosen message at-
tacks (EUF-CMA) in the random oracle model (ROM) under two assumptions from coding
theory, both NP-complete and strongly related to the hardness of decoding in a random lin-
ear code. Another crucial ingredient is the proof that the syndromes produced by (U,U+V )
codes are statistically indistinguishable from random syndromes. Note that these two key
properties are also required for applying a recent and generic proof for code-based signature
schemes in the QROM [CD17]. As noticed there, this allows to instantiate the code family
which is needed and yields a security proof of our scheme in the QROM. Our scheme also
enjoys an efficient signature generation and verification. For a (classical) security of 128 bits,
the signature size is less than one kilobyte. Contrarily to a current trend in code-based or
lattice cryptography which reduces key sizes by using structured codes or lattices based on
rings, we avoid this here and still get reasonable public key sizes (less than 2 megabytes for
the aforementioned security level). Our key sizes compare favorably with TESLA-2, which
is an (unstructured) lattice-based signature scheme that has also a security reduction in the
QROM. This gives the first practical signature scheme based on binary codes which comes
with a security proof and which scales well with the security parameter: for a security level
of 2λ, the signature size is of order O(λ), public key size is of size O(λ2), signature generation
cost is of order O(λ3), and signature verification cost is of order O(λ2).
Keywords: code-based cryptography, digital signature scheme, decoding algorithm, security
proof.
1 Introduction
Code-based signature schemes. It is a long standing open problem to build an efficient and
secure signature scheme based on the hardness of decoding a linear code which could compete in
all respects with DSA or RSA. Such schemes could indeed give a quantum resistant signature for
replacing in practice the aforementioned signature schemes that are well known to be broken by
quantum computers. A first partial answer to this question was given in [CFS01]. It consisted in
adapting the Niederreiter scheme [Nie86] for this purpose. This requires a linear code for which
there exists an efficient decoding algorithm for a non-negligible set of inputs. This means that if
H is an r × n parity-check matrix of the code, there exists for a non-negligible set of elements s
in Fr2 an efficient way to find a word e in Fn2 of smallest Hamming weight such that HeT = sT . In
such a case, we say that s, which is generally called a syndrome in the literature, can be decoded.
To sign a message m, a hash function h is used to produce a sequence s0, . . . , s` of elements of Fr2.
For instance s0 = h(m) and si = h(s0, i) for i > 0. The first si that can be decoded defines the
signature of m as the word e of smallest Hamming weight such that
HeT = sTi .
? This work was supported in part by the Commission of the European Communities through the Horizon
2020 program under project number 645622 PQCRYPTO.
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The CFS signature scheme. The authors of [CFS01] noticed that very high rate Goppa codes
are able to fulfill this task, and their scheme can indeed be considered as the first step towards
a solution of the aforementioned problem. Moreover they gave a security proof of their scheme
relying only on the assumption that two problems were hard, namely (i) decoding a generic linear
code and (ii) distinguishing a Goppa code from a random linear code with the same parameters.
However, afterwards it was realized that the parameters proposed in [CFS01] can be attacked by
an unpublished attack of Bleichenbacher. The significant increase of parameters needed to thwart
the Bleichenbacher attack was fixed by a slight variation [Fin10]. However, this modified scheme
is not able to fix two other worrying drawbacks of the CFS scheme, namely
(i) a lack of security proof in light of the distinguisher of high rate Goppa codes found in [FGO+11]
(see also [FGO+13] for more details) which shows that the hypotheses used in [CFS01] to give
a security proof of the signature scheme were not met,
(ii) poor scaling of the parameters when security has to be increased. It can be readily seen that
the complexity S of the best known attack scales only polynomially as S ≈ Kt/2 where K is
the key size in bits and t is some parameter that has to be kept very small (say smaller than
12 in practice), since the number of syndromes si that have to be computed before finding one
that can be decoded is roughly t!.
Other code-based signature schemes. Other signature schemes based on codes were also
given in the literature such as for instance the KKS scheme [KKS97, KKS05] or its variants
[BMS11, GS12]. But they can be considered at best to be one-time signature schemes in the light
of the attack given in [COV07] and great care has to be taken to choose the parameters of these
schemes as shown by [OT11] which broke all the parameters proposed in [KKS97, KKS05, BMS11].
There has been some revival of the CFS strategy [CFS01], by choosing other code families. The
new code families that were used are LDGM codes in [BBC+13], i.e. codes with a Low Density
Generator Matrix, or (essentially) convolutional codes [GSJB14]. There are still some doubts that
there is a way to choose the parameters of the scheme [GSJB14] in order to avoid the attack [LT13]
on the McEliece cryptosystem based on convolutional codes [LJ12] and the LDGM scheme was
broken in [PT16].
A last possibility is to use the Fiat-Shamir heuristic to turn a zero-knowledge authentication
scheme into a signature scheme. When based on the Stern authentication scheme [Ste93] this
gives a code-based signature scheme. However this approach leads to really large signature sizes
(of the order of hundreds of thousands of bits). This represents a complete picture of code-based
signature schemes based on the Hamming metric. There has been some recent progress in this area
for another metric, namely the rank metric [GRSZ14] with the RankSign scheme. This scheme
enjoys remarkably small key sizes, it is of order tens of thousands bits for 128 bits of security. It
also comes with a partial security proof showing that signatures do not leak information when
the number of available signatures is smaller than some bound depending on the code alphabet,
but ensuring this condition represents a rather strong constraint on the parameters of RankSign.
Moreover there is no overall reduction of the security to well identified problems in (rank metric)
coding theory. Irrespective of the merits of this signature scheme, it is certainly desirable to also
have a signature scheme for the Hamming metric due to the general faith in the hardness of
decoding in it.
Moving from error-correcting codes to lossy source codes. It can be argued that the main
problem with the CFS approach is to find a family of linear codes that are at the same time (i)
indistinguishable from a random code and (ii) that have a non-negligible fraction of syndromes
that can be decoded. There are not so many codes for which (ii) can be achieved and this is
probably too much to ask for. However if we relax a little bit what we ask for the code, namely
just a code such that the equation (in e)
HeT = sT (1)
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admits for most of the s’s a solution e of small enough weight, then there are many more codes
that are able to fulfill this task. This kind of codes are not used in error-correction but can be
found in lossy source coding or source-distortion theory where the problem is to find codes with
an associated decoding algorithm which can approximate any word of the ambient space by a
close enough codeword. In the case of linear codes, this means a code and a associated decoding
algorithm that can find for any syndrome s a vector e of small enough weight satisfying (1) where
H is a parity-check matrix of the code.
Solving (1) is the basic problem upon which all code-based cryptography relies. This problem
has been studied for a long time and despite many efforts on this issue [Pra62, Ste88, Dum91,
Bar97, MMT11, BJMM12, MO15, DT17] the best algorithms for solving this problem [BJMM12,
MO15] are exponential in the weight w of e as long as w = (1− )r/2 for any  > 0. Furthermore
when w is sublinear in n, the exponent of the best known algorithms has not changed [CTS16] since
the Prange algorithm [Pra62] dating back to the early sixties. Moreover, it seems very difficult to
lower this exponent by a multiplicative factor smaller than 12 in the quantum computation model
as illustrated by [Ber10, KT17].
Our contribution: a new signature scheme based on (U,U + V ) codes. Convolutional
codes, LDGM and polar codes come with a decoding algorithm which is polynomial for weights
below r/2. They could theoretically be used in this context. However in the light of the key attacks
[LJ12, PT16, BCD+16] performed on related schemes, it seems very difficult to propose parameters
which avoid those attacks. We are instead introducing a new class of codes in this context namely
(U,U + V ) codes. A (U,U + V ) code is just a way of building a code of length n when we have
two codes U and V of length n/2. It consists in
(U,U + V )
4
={(u,u + v) : u ∈ U,v ∈ V }.
Generalized (U,U+V ) codes have already been proposed in the cryptographic context for building
a McEliece encryption scheme [MCT16a]. However, there it was suggested to take U and V to be
codes that have an efficient decoding algorithm (this is mandatory in the encryption context). In
the signature context, when we just need to find a small enough solution of (1) this is not needed.
In our case, we can afford to choose random codes for U and V . It turns out that if we choose U
and V random with the right choice of the dimension of U and V , then a suitable use of the Prange
algorithm on the code U and the code V provides an advantage in this setting. It allows to solve
(1) for weights w that are significantly below r/2, that is in the range of weights for which there
are an exponential number of solutions but the best decoding algorithms are still exponential.
Moreover, by tweaking a little bit the output of the Prange algorithm in our case and performing
an appropriate rejection sampling, it turns out that the signatures are indistinguishable from a
random word of weight w. Furthermore we also show that syndromes HeT associated to this
kind of codes are statistically indistinguishable from random syndromes when errors e are drawn
uniformly at random among the words of weight w. These are the two key properties that allow
to give a tight security proof of our signature scheme which relies only on two problems:
P1: Solving the decoding problem (1) when w is sufficiently below r/2
P2: Deciding whether a linear code is permuted (U,U + V ) code or not.
Interestingly enough some recent work [CD17] has shown that these two properties (namely statis-
tical indistinguishability of the signatures and the syndromes associated to the code family chosen
in the scheme) are also enough to obtain a tight security proof in the quantum random oracle
model (QROM) for generic code-based signatures under the assumption that Problem P1 stays
hard against a quantum computer and that the code family used is computationally indistinguish-
able from generic linear codes. In other words, as noticed in [CD17], this can be used to give a
tight security proof of our (U,U + V ) codes in the QROM.
Problem P1 is the problem upon which all code-based cryptography relies. Here we are in
a case where there are multiple solutions of (1) and the adversary may produce any number of
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instances of (1) with the same matrix H and various syndromes s and is interested in solving
only one of them. This relates to the, so called, Decoding One Out of Many (DOOM) problem.
This problem was first considered in [JJ02]. It was shown there how to modify slightly the known
algorithms for decoding a linear code in order to solve this modified problem. This modification
was later analyzed in [Sen11]. The parameters of the known algorithms for solving (1) can be
easily adapted to this scenario where we have to decode simultaneously multiple instances which
all have multiple solutions.
Problem P2 might seem at first sight to be an ad-hoc problem. However as we are going to
show, it is an NP-complete problem (see Theorem 3 in Subsection 7.1). Problem P1 is known
to be NP-complete and therefore we have a signature scheme whose security relies entirely on
NP-complete problems. This is the first time that a code-based signature scheme is proposed
with such features. Interestingly enough, even weak versions of this problem are NP-complete. For
instance, even in the case when the permutation is restricted to leave globally stable the right and
left part, detecting whether the resulting code is a permuted (U,U + V )-code is already an NP-
complete problem (see Problem 5 and Theorem 4 in Subsection 7.1). Furthermore, we are really
in a situation where the resulting permuted (U,U + V ) code is actually very close to a random
code. The only different behavior that can be found seems to be in the weight distribution for
small weights. In this case, the permuted (U,U +V ) code has some codewords of a weight slightly
smaller than the minimum distance of a random code of the same length and dimension. It is very
tempting to conjecture that the best algorithms for solving Problem P2 come from detecting such
codewords. This approach can be easily thwarted by choosing the parameters of the scheme in
such a way that the best algorithms for solving this task are of prohibitive complexity. Notice that
the best algorithms that we have for detecting such codewords are in essence precisely the generic
algorithms for solving Problem P1. In some sense, it seems that we might rely on the very same
problem, even if our proof technique does not show this.
All in all, this gives the first practical signature scheme based on binary codes which comes
with a security proof and which scales well with the parameters: it can be shown that if one wants a
security level of 2λ, then signature size is of order O(λ), public key size is of order O(λ2), signature
generation is of order O(λ3), whereas signature verification is of order O(λ2). It should be noted
that contrarily to the current thread of research in code-based or lattice-based cryptography which
consists in relying on structured codes or lattices based on ring structures in order to decrease the
key-sizes we did not follow this approach here. This allows for instance to rely on the NP-complete
problem P1 which is generally believed to be hard on average rather that on decoding in quasi-
cyclic codes for instance whose status is still unclear with a constant number of circulant blocks.
Despite the fact that we did not use the standard approach for reducing the key sizes relying on
quasi-cyclic codes for instance, we obtain acceptable key sizes (less than 2 megabytes for 128 bits
of security) which compare very favorably to unstructured lattice-based signature schemes such
as TESLA-2 for instance [ABB+17]. This is due in part to the tightness of our security reduction.
We would like to conclude this introduction by pointing out the simplicity of the parameter
selection of our scheme (see end of §5). The parameters for a given length n are chosen as
w = bn3−
√
5
4
c ; kV = w ; kU = n/2− kV
where w is the signature weight and kU (resp. kV ) is the dimension of the code U (resp. V ). The
length n is then chosen in order to thwart the attacks on problems P1 and P2 (actually it is
Problem P1 that will govern the length selection).
Organization of the paper. The paper is organized as follows, we present our scheme in §3, in
§4 we prove it is secure under existential unforgeability under an adaptive chosen message attack
(EUF-CMA) in the ROM, in relation with this proof we respectively examine in §5, §6, and §7,
how to produce uniformly distributed signatures as well as the best message and key attacks.
Finally we give some set of parameters on par with the security reduction and with the current
state-of-the-art for decoding techniques.
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2 Notation
We provide here some notation that will be used throughout the paper.
General notation. The notation x
4
= y means that x is defined to be equal to y. We denote by
F2 the finite field with 2 elements and by Sw the subset of Fn2 of words of weight w.
Vector notation. Vectors will be written with bold letters (such as e) and uppercase bold letters
are used to denote matrices (such as H). Vectors are in row notation. Let x and y be two vectors,
we will write (x,y) to denote their concatenation. For a vector x = (xi)1≤i≤n and a permutation
pi of length n we denote by pi(x) the vector (xpi(i))1≤i≤n. We also denote for a subset I of positions
of the vector x = (xi)1≤i≤n by xI the vector whose components are those of x which are indexed
by I, i.e.
xI = (xi)i∈I .
We define the support of x as
Supp(x)
4
={i ∈ {1, · · · , n} such that xi 6= 0}
The Hamming weight of x is denoted by |x|. By some abuse of notation, we will use the same
notation to denote the size of a finite set: |S| stands for the size of the finite set S. It will be clear
from the context whether |x| means the Hamming weight or the size of a finite set. Note that
|x| = |Supp(x)|.
Probabilistic notation. Let S be a finite set, then x ←↩ S means that x is assigned to be
a random element chosen uniformly at random in S. For a distribution D we write ξ ∼ D to
indicate that the random variable ξ is chosen according to D. The uniform distribution on a
certain discrete set is denoted by U . The set will be specified in the text. We denote the uniform
distribution on Sw by Uw. When we have probability distributions D1, D2, . . . , Dn over discrete
sets E1, E2, . . . , En, we denote by D1 ⊗ D2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Dn the product probability distribution, i.e
D1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Dn(x1, . . . , xn)4=D1(x1) . . .Dn(xn) for (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ E1 × · · · × En. The n-th power
product of a distribution D is denoted by D⊗n, i.e. D⊗n 4=D ⊗ · · · ⊗ D︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
.
Sometimes when we wish to emphasize on which probability space the probabilities or the
expectations are taken, we denote by a subscript the random variable specifying the associated
probability space over which the probabilities or expectations are taken. For instance the proba-
bility PX(E) of the event E is taken over Ω the probability space over which the random variable
X is defined, i.e. if X is for instance a real random variable, X is a function from a probability
space Ω to R, and the aforementioned probability is taken according to the probability chosen for
Ω.
Coding theory. A binary linear code C of length n and dimension k is a subspace of Fn2 of
dimension k and is usually defined by a parity-check matrix H of size r × n as
C = {x ∈ Fn2 : HxT = 0} .
When H is of full rank (which is usually the case) we have r = n− k. The rate of this code (that
we denote by R) is defined as R
4
= kn . In this case we say that C is a [n, k]-code.
3 The (U,U + V )-signature Scheme
3.1 The general scheme Scode
Our scheme can be viewed as a probabilistic version of the full domain hash (FDH) signature
scheme as defined in [BR96] which is similar to the probabilistic signature scheme introduced in
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[Cor02] except that we replace RSA with a trapdoor function based upon the hardness of Problem
P1. Let C be a binary linear code of length n defined by a parity-check matrix H. The one way
function fH,w we consider is given by
fH,w : Sw −→ Fn−k2
e 7−→ eHT
Inverting this function on an input s amounts to solve Problem P1. We are ready now to give the
general scheme we consider. We assume that we have a family of codes which is defined by a set
F of parity-check matrices of size (n − k) × n such that for all Hsec ∈ F we have an algorithm
DHsec,w which on input s computes e ∈ f−1Hsec,w(s). Then we pick uniformly at random Hsec ∈ F ,
an n × n permutation matrix P, a non-singular matrix S ∈ F(n−k)×(n−k)2 which define the secret
and public key as:
sk ← (Hsec,P,S) ; pk ← Hpub where Hpub 4= SHP
Remark 1. Let Csec be the code defined by Hsec, then Hpub defines the following code:
Cpub = {cP : c ∈ Csec}.
We also select a cryptographic hash function h : {0, 1}∗ → Fn−k2 and a parameter λ0 for the
random salt r. The algorithms Sgnsk and Vrfypk are defined as follows
Sgnsk(m): Vrfypk(m, (e′, r)):
r←↩ {0, 1}λ0 s← h(m, r)
s← h(m, r) if Hpube′T = sT and |e′| = w return 1
e← DHsec,w(S−1sT ) else return 0
return(eP, r)
Remark 2. We add a salt in the scheme in order to have a tight security proof.
The correction of the verification step (i.e. that the pair (eP, r) passes the verification step)
follows from the fact that by definition of DHsec,w(S
−1sT ) we have HseceT = S−1sT . Therefore
Hpub(eP)
T = (HpubP
T )eT = SHsece
T = SS−1sT = sT . We also have |eP| = |e| = w.
To summarize, a valid signature of a message m consists of a pair (e, r) such that Hpube
T =
h(m, r)T with e of Hamming weight w.
3.2 Source-distortion codes and decoders
Source-distortion theory is a branch of information theory which deals with obtaining a family of
codes, with an associated set of parity-check matrices H ∈ F , of the smallest possible dimension
which can be used in our setting (i.e. for which we can invert fH,w). Recall that a linear code
is a vector space and the dimension of the code is defined as the dimension of this vector space.
For a linear code specified by a full rank parity-check matrix of size r× n, the dimension k of the
code is equal to n− r. It is essential to have the smallest possible dimension in our cryptographic
application, since this makes the associated problem P1 harder: the smaller n− r is, the bigger r
is and the further away w can be from r/2 (where solving P1 becomes easy). This kind of codes is
used for performing lossy coding of a source. Indeed assume that we can perform this task, then
this means that for every binary word y, we compute sT
4
= HyT , we find e of Hamming weight
w such that HeT = sT which leads to deduce a codeword c
4
= y − e which is at distance w from
y. The word y is compressed with a compact description of c. Since the dimension of the code is
n − r we just need n − r bits to store a description of c. We have replaced here y with a word
which is not too far away from it. Of course, the smaller n− r is, the smaller the compression rate
n−r
n is. There is some loss by replacing y by c since we are in general close to y but not equal to
it.
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In this way, finding a close codeword c of a given word y is equivalent to find for the syndrome
HyT a low weight “error” e such that HeT = HyT . For our purpose it will be more convenient
to adopt the error and syndrome viewpoint than the codeword viewpoint. To stress the similarity
with error-correction we will call the function which associates to a syndrome s such an e a
source-distortion decoder.
Definition 1 (Source Distortion Decoder). Let n, k ≤ n be integers and let F be a family
of parity-check matrices (which define binary linear codes of length n and dimension k). A source
distortion decoder for F is a probabilistic algorithm D:
D : F × Fn−k2 −→ Fn2
(H, s) 7−→ e
such that HeT = sT . When the weight of the error is fixed, we call it a decoder of fixed distortion
w and we denote it by Dw. We say that the distortion w is achievable if there exists a family of
codes with a decoder of fixed distortion w.
This discussion raises a first question: for given n and k, what is the minimal distortion w which
is achievable? We know from Shannon’s rate-distortion theorem that the minimal w is given by
the Gilbert-Varshamov bound dGV(n, k) which follows:
Definition 2 (Gilbert-Varshamov’s bound). For given integers n and k such that k ≤ n, the
Gilbert-Varshamov bound dGV(n, k) is given by:
dGV(n, k)
4
=nh−1 (1− k/n)
where h denotes the binary entropy: h(x) = −x log2 x − (1 − x) log2(1 − x) and h−1 its inverse
defined on [0, 1] and whose range is [0, 12 ].
Achieving distortion w = (n − k)/2 with the Prange technique. The study of random
codes shows that they achieve the Gilbert-Varshamov source-distortion bound in average. Never-
theless we do not know for them an efficient source-distortion algorithm. However, as the following
proposition shows, it is not the case when the distortion w is higher. When w = (n − k)/2 there
is a very efficient decoder using the Prange technique [Pra62] for decoding. To explain it consider
a parity-check matrix H which defines a linear code C of dimension k and length n. We want to
find for a given s ∈ Fn−k2 an error e of low weight such that HeT = sT . H is a full-rank matrix
and it therefore contains an invertible submatrix A of size (n − k) × (n − k). We choose a set
of positions I of size n − k for which H restricted to these positions is a full rank matrix. For
simplicity assume that this matrix is in the first n − k positions: H = (A|B). We look for an e
of the form e = (e′,0) where e′ ∈ Fn−k2 . We should therefore have sT = HeT = Ae′T , that is
e′T = A−1sT . The expected weight of e′ is n−k2 and it is easily verified that by randomly picking
a random set I of size n− k we have to check a polynomial number of them until finding an e′T
of weight exactly (n− k)/2.
Notation. We denote by DPrange(n−k)/2 this fixed distortion decoder and by D
Prange the decoder which
picks a random subset until finding one for which H restricted to the columns corresponding to I
is invertible and computes e′ as explained above. DPrange does not necessarily output an error of
weight (n− k)/2.
From the previous discussion we easily obtain
Proposition 1 (Generic Source Distortion Decoder).
The decoder DPrange(n−k)/2 runs in polynomial time on average over full rank (n− k)× n matrices.
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When we consider in general the family of random parity-check matrices (which define random
linear codes) we speak about generic source-distortion decoders as there is no structure, except
linearity of the code they define. In contrast to the distortion (n − k)/2, the only algorithms we
know for linear codes for smaller values of w are all exponential in the distortion. This is illustrated
by Figure 1 where we give the exponents (divided by the length n) of the complexity in base 2 as
a function of the distance, for the fixed rate R = k/n = 0.5, of the best generic fixed-w source-
distortion decoders. As we see, the normalized exponent is 0 for distortion (n − k)/2 and the
difficulty increases as w approaches the Gilbert-Varshamov bound (which is equal approximately
to 0.11n in this case).
Fig. 1. Normalized exponents in base 2 of the best generic fixed-w source distortion decoders.
Decoding Errors and Erasures Simultaneously. In the following problem, the word x, more
precisely its support, is called the erasure pattern.
Problem 1 (Decoding Errors and Erasures).
Instance: H ∈ F(n−k)×n2 , s ∈ Fn−k2 , x ∈ Fn2 , ν integer
Output: e ∈ Fn2 such that HeT = sT and |Supp(e) \ Supp(x)| = ν
In fact, the weight of the solution e is constrained outside of the erasure pattern x. Within the
erasure pattern the coordinates of e can take any value. For the sake of simplicity, we will overload
the notation and denote Dν(H, s,x) a solution of the above problem whereas Dν(H, s) denotes
the (erasure-less) decoding of ν errors. The problem of erasure decoding appears very naturally
in coding theory, including in source-distortion problem. We may reduce the error and erasure
decoding to an error only decoding in a smaller code.
Proposition 2. Let H ∈ F(n−k)×n2 and x ∈ Fn2 be such that the |x| = ρ columns of H indexed by
Supp(x) are independent. For any s ∈ Fn−k2 we can derive e = Dν(H, s,x) from e′′ = Dν(H′′, s′′)
in polynomial time where
(i) H′′ ∈ F(n−k−ρ)×(n−ρ)2 can be derived in polynomial time from H and x,
(ii) s′′ ∈ Fn−k−ρ2 can be derived in polynomial time from H, x, and s.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that the ‘1’s in x come first, x = (1 · · · 1, 0 · · · 0). A
Gaussian elimination on H using the first ρ positions as pivots yields
SH =
(
Iρ H
′
0 H′′
)
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for some non-singular matrix S. Let (s′, s′′) = sST with s′ ∈ Fρ2 and s′′ ∈ Fn−k−ρ2 , e′′ = Dν(H′′, s′′),
e′ = s′ + e′′H′T , and e = (e′, e′′). We easily check that HeT = sT and |Supp(e) \ Supp(x)| =
|Supp(e′′)| = ν, thus e = Dν(H, s,x). All operations, except possibly the call to Dν , are polyno-
mial time. uunionsq
The reduction of the above proposition applies to DPrange. Given (H, s,x) and using the notation
of the proof, we set e′′ = DPrange(H′′, s′′) and we denote e = (e′, e′′) = DPrange(H, s,x) the
corresponding error. With fixed distortion we have e′′ = DPrange(n−k−|x|)/2(H
′′, s′′) and we denote
e = DPrange(n−k−|x|)/2(H, s,x).
Finally, let us point out that if H is the parity check matrix of a binary linear [n, k]-code C,
the matrix H′′ that appears in Proposition 2 is the parity-check matrix of the punctured code in
I = Supp(x) as defined below:
Definition 3 (Punctured code). Consider a code C of length n. The punctured code PuncI(C)
in a set of positions I ⊂ {1, . . . , n} is a code of length n− |I| defined as
Punc
I
(C)4={cI¯ : c ∈ C}
where I¯ = {1, . . . , n} \ I.
Therefore, what Proposition 2 says is that decoding ν errors and ρ erasures in an [n, k]-code is
essentially the same thing as decoding ν errors in an [n− ρ, k]-code.
3.3 The (U,U + V ) Code Family and Its Decoding
Source-distortion theory has found over the years several families of codes with an efficient source-
distortion algorithm which achieves asymptotically the Gilbert-Varshamov source-distortion bound,
one of the most prominent ones being probably the Arikan polar codes [Arı09] (see [Kor09]). The
naive way would be to build our signature on such a code-family and hoping that permuting the
code positions and publishing a random parity-check matrix of the permuted code would destroy
all the structure used for decoding. All known families of codes used in this context have low
weight codewords and this can be used to mount an attack. We will proceed differently here and
introduce in this setting the (U,U + V ) codes mentioned in the introduction. The point is that
they (i) have very little structure, (ii) have a very simple source-distortion decoder which is more
powerful than the generic source decoder, (iii) they do not suffer from low weight codewords as
was the case with the aforementioned families. It will be useful to recall here that
Definition 4 ((U,U + V )-Codes). Let U , V be linear binary codes of length n/2 and dimension
kU , kV . We define the subset of Fn2 :
(U,U + V )
4
={(u,u + v) such that u ∈ U and v ∈ V }
which is a linear code of length n and dimension k = kU + kV . The resulting code is of minimum
distance min(2dU , dV ) where dU is the minimum distance of U and dV is the minimum distance
of V . A parity-check matrix of such a code is given by(
HU 0
HV HV
)
where HU ∈ F(n/2−kU )×n/22 (resp. HV ∈ F(n/2−kV )×n/22 ) is a parity-check matrix of U (resp. V ).
We are now going to present a source-distortion for a (U,U + V ) code.
We can use the generic source-distortion decoder of Proposition 1 for source distortion decoding
a (U,U + V ) code. Assume that we have a (U,U + V ) code of length n of parity-check matrix
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Hsec
4
=
(
HU 0
HV HV
)
where HU ,HV are random and a syndrome s = (s1, s2) ∈ Fn/2−kU2 × Fn/2−kV2
that we want to decode. Let us first remark that, for e = (e1, e2) ∈ Fn/22 × Fn/22 ,
Hsece
T =
(
HUe
T
1
HV (e1 + e2)
T
)
=
(
sT1
sT2
)
⇐⇒ HUeT1 = sT1 and HV (e1 + e2)T = sT2
In this way, we first decode s2 in V to find eV
4
= e1 + e2. That is eV = D
Prange
(n/2−kV )/2(HV , s2)
with Prange’s polynomial time fixed distortion algorithm. We next decode s1 in U using eV as
an erasure pattern. The idea here is that eV covers a large part of e1 leaving us with an error
which is, hopefully, easier to find. We compute eU = D
Prange
(n/2−kU−|eV |)/2(HU , s1, eV ) with Prange’s
polynomial time fixed distortion algorithm. We claim that e = (e1, e2) = (eU , eV + eU ) verifies
Hsece
T = sT and has weight n/2− kU . The procedure is described in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 UV -sddV1 : (U,U + V )−Source Distortion Decoder
Parameter: a (U,U + V ) code of length n and dimension k = kU + kV
Input: (s1, s2) with s1 ∈ Fn/2−kU2 , s2 ∈ Fn/2−kV2
Output: e ∈ Fn2
Assumes: 2kU − kV ≤ n/2.
1: eV ← DPrange(n/2−kV )/2(HV , s2)
2: ν ← (n/2− kU − |eV |)/2
3: eU ← DPrangeν (HU , s1, eV )
4: return (eU , eU + eV )
Proposition 3. The algorithm UV -sddV1 is a fixed-(n/2− kU ) source-distortion decoder which
works in polynomial average-time when 2kU − kV ≤ n/2.
Proof. First remark that both calls to DPrange are made for a distortion level that is achieved
in polynomial time. It only remains to prove that the output has the expected weight. We have
|eV | = (n/2 − kV )/2. The word eU splits in two disjoint parts e′U whose support is Supp(eU ) ∩
Supp(eV ) and e
′′
U whose support is Supp(eU ) \ Supp(eV ). By construction, the second call to
Prange corrects exactly ν
4
=(n/2 − kU − |eV |)/2 errors, this is also the weight of e′′U . Finally we
can write e1 = eU = e
′
U + e
′′
U and e2 = eU + eV = (e
′
U + eV ) + e
′′
U with Supp(e
′
U ) ⊂ Supp(eV )
and Supp(e′′U ) ∩ Supp(eV ) = ∅. We derive that |e1| = |e′U | + |e′′U |, |e2| = |e′U + eV | + |e′′U |, and
|e′U + eV |+ |e′U | = |eV |. And finally |e| = |e1|+ |e2| = |eV |+ 2ν = n/2− kU . uunionsq
We can now choose the parameters kU and kV in order to minimize the distortion n/2− kU for a
fixed dimension k = kU + kV of the code. Let us define the relative error weight of e ∈ Fn2 as |e|n .
Figure 2 compares the relative error weight we obtain with the algorithm UV -sddV1 to 1n (n−k)/2
which corresponds to what is achieved by the generic decoder and to the optimal relative Gilbert-
Varshamov relative weight h−1(1 − R) where R denotes the rate of the code defined as k/n. As
we see there is a non-negligible gain. Nevertheless, UV -sddV1 approximates to a fixed distance
in each step of its execution which leads to correlations between some bits that can be used to
recover the structure of the secret key. In order to fix this problem and as it is asked in our proof
of security, we will present a modified version of UV -sddV1 in §5 which uses a rejection sampling
method to simulate uniform outputs. This comes at the price of slightly increasing the weight of
the error output by the decoder.
3.4 (U,U + V ) codes and cryptography
It is not the first time that (U,U+V ) codes are suggested for a cryptographic use. This was already
considered for constructing a McEliece cryptosystem in [KKS05, p.225-228] or more recently in
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Fig. 2. Comparison of the Optimal Signature Distance, the Gilbert-Varshamov Bound and Generic Dis-
tance
[PMIB17] (it is namely a particular case of a generalized concatenated code). However both papers
did not consider the improvement in the error correction performance that comes with the (U,U+
V )-construction if a decoder that uses soft information is used. For instance [KKS05] studies only
the case of hard-decision decoder for Goppa codes and concludes that the obtained code has a
worse error correction capability than the original Goppa code and therefore worse public-key sizes.
This is actually a situation which really depends on the code family (call it F) and its decoder.
If F is the family of (generalized) Reed-Solomon codes with the Koetter-Vardy decoder which is
able to cope with soft information on the symbols, then the results go the other way round (at
least in a certain range of rates) [MCT16b]. In this case, a (U,U + V ) code based on generalized
Reed-Solomon codes, has for certain rates better error-correction capacity when decoded with the
Koetter-Vardy decoder than a generalized Reed-Solomon of the same rate decoded with the same
decoder. This allows in principle to decrease the public key-size. Our signature scheme where F
is the family of linear codes and the associated (source-distortion) decoder is the Prange decoder
is another example of this kind.
In order to understand what soft-decoding has to do in this setting, it is helpful to recall a few
points from coding theory. What we are going to review here is how a (U,U+V ) code is decoded in
the polar code construction [Arı09] or in the case of Reed-Muller codes [DS06]. Consider a binary
linear code of length n defined by a parity-check matrix H. In hard decoding, we aim at recovering
the error e of minimum weight satisfying a given syndrome HeT = sT . In soft decoding, we know
all probabilities P(ei = 1) and want to find the error which maximizes P(e|HeT = sT ). Both
decoding perform the same task in the case of a binary symmetric channel of crossover probability
p ≤ 12 (this means that P(ei = 1) = p for all i).
It turns out that soft-decoding is the natural scenario for decoding a (U,U + V ) code when
we decode the V component first and then the U component, even if one wants to perform hard
decoding of the whole (U,U + V ) code. This really amounts to find the error of minimum weight
e = (eU , eU + eV ) such that (
HU 0
HV HV
)(
eTU
eTU + e
T
V
)
=
(
sT1
sT2
)
. (2)
We will assume that the error model is a binary symmetric channel of crossover probability p,
meaning that
P(eU (i) = 1) = p (3)
P(eU (i) + eV (i) = 1) = p (4)
16 Thomas Debris-Alazard, Nicolas Sendrier, and Jean-Pierre Tillich
where eU (i) and eV (i) denote the i-th coordinate of eU and eV respectively. Recall that hard de-
coding e really amounts to soft-information decoding e with respect to this error model. Decoding
can now be done through the following steps.
Step 1. We observe that (2) implies that HV e
T
V = s
T
2 . Recovering the V component amounts
here to hard decode eV . The rationale behind this is that the channel model of eV (i) is a binary
symmetric channel of crossover probability 2p(1− p). This can be verified by observing that eV =
eU + (eU + eV ) with eU and eU + eV being independent random variables whose components are
i.i.d. with probability distributions given by (3) and (4). From this we deduce that the components
eV (i) are i.i.d. with P(eV (i) = 1) = 2p(1−p). Let us now assume that we have decoded eV correctly.
Step 2. Recovering eU can in principle be done in two different ways. The first one uses (2)
directly from which we deduce
HUe
T
U = s
T
1 . (5)
Now that we know eV we could also notice that
HU (eU + eV )
T = HUe
T
U + HUe
T
V = s
T
1 + HUe
T
V (6)
and we know here the right-hand term. There are therefore two ways to recover eU
Method 1 We perform hard decoding of the syndrome sT1 and find the eU of minimum weight satisfying
(5).
Method 2 We perform hard decoding of the syndrome sT1 + HUe
T
V by finding the vector x of minimum
weight satisfying HUx
T = sT1 + HUe
T
V and let eU = x + eV .
In [KKS05] it is suggested to perform both decodings and to choose for computing eU the decoding
which gives the smallest error weight (the decoding is not explained in terms of syndromes there,
but expressing their decoding in terms of syndrome decoding amounts to the decision rule that we
have just given). It is clear that some amount of information is lost during this process. This can
be seen by noticing that once we know eV , we have a much finer knowledge on eU . It is readily
seen that we can now use P(eU (i) = 1|eV (i)) instead of P(eU (i) = 1). This calculation follows
from the fact that eU (i) and eU (i) + eV (i) are independent and we know the distribution of these
two random variables. A straightforward calculation leads to
P(eU (i) = 1|eV (i) = 0) = p
2
(1− p)2 + p2 (7)
P(eU (i) = 1|eV (i) = 1) = 1
2
. (8)
In other words, when eV (i) = 0, we can view eU (i) as an error originating from a binary symmetric
channel of crossover probability p
2
(1−p)2+p2 (which is much smaller than p) and when eV (i) = 1
we may consider that the position has just been erased. A decoder for U which uses this soft
information has potentially much better performances than the previous hard decoder. In fact, in
this case we just need a decoder which decodes errors and erasures. When the alphabet is non
binary, the channel model is slightly more complicated: this is why the Koetter-Vardy soft decoder
is used in [MCT16b] and not just an error and erasure decoder of generalized Reed-Solomon codes.
By using the noise model corresponding to the probability computations (7) and (8) we obtain
a much less noisy model than the original binary symmetric channel. This can be checked by a
capacity calculation which is in a sense a measure of the noise of transmission channel (the capacity
is a decreasing function of the noise level in some sense). The capacity of the binary symmetric
channel of crossover probability p is 1 − h(p) whereas it is 1 − 2h(p) + h(2p(1 − p)) for the noise
model corresponding to the probability computations (7) and (8). We have represented these two
capacities in Figure 3 and it can be verified there that the new noise model has a much larger
capacity than the original channel.
This discussion explains why in the binary setting we would really like to use a decoder for
U which is able to correct errors on the positions where eV (i) = 0 and erasures on the positions
where eV (i) = 1. In our context where we perform source-distortion decoding the situation is
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Fig. 3. Capacity of the original binary symmetric channel vs. capacity of the channel model corresponding
to the probability computations (7) and (8).
actually similar. Our strategy works here because the Prange decoder has a natural and powerful
extension to the error/erasure scenario. It is natural to expect that a family of codes and associated
decoders which are powerful in the erasure/error scenario behave better when used in a (U,U+V )
construction and decoded as above, than the original family of codes. Our strategy for obtaining
a signature scheme really builds upon this approach : a (U,U + V ) code decoded as above with
the Prange decoder has better distortion than the Prange decoder used directly on a linear code
with the same length and dimension as the (U,U + V )-code. The trapdoor here for obtaining the
better distortion is only the (U,U + V ) structure, but we can afford to have random linear codes
for U and V .
4 Security Proof
We give in this section a security proof of the signature scheme Scode. This proof is in the spirit
of the security proof of the FDH signatures in the random oracle model (see [BR93]). However in
order to have a tight security reduction we were inspired by the proof of [Cor02]. Our main result
is to reduce the security to two major problems in code-based cryptography.
4.1 Basic tools
Basic definitions. A function f(n) is said to be negligible if for all polynomials p(n), |f(n)| <
p(n)−1 for all sufficiently large n. The statistical distance between two discrete probability distri-
butions over a same space E is defined as:
ρ(D0,D1)4= 1
2
∑
x∈E
|D0(x)−D1(x)|.
We will need the following well known property for the statistical distance which can be easily
proved by induction.
Proposition 4. Let (D01, . . . ,D0n) and (D11, . . . ,D1n) be two n-tuples of discrete probability distri-
butions where D0i and D1i are distributed over a same space Ei. We have for all positive integers
n:
ρ
(D01 ⊗ · · · ⊗ D0n,D11 ⊗ · · · ⊗ D1n) ≤ n∑
i=1
ρ(D0i ,D1i ).
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A distinguisher between two distributions D0 and D1 over the same space E is a randomized
algorithm which takes as input an element of E that follows the distribution D0 or D1 and outputs
b ∈ {0, 1}. It is characterized by its advantage:
AdvD
0,D1(A)4=Pξ∼D0 (A(ξ) outputs 1)− Pξ∼D1 (A(ξ) outputs 1) .
We call this quantity the advantage of A against D0 and D1.
Definition 5 (Computational Distance and Indistinguishability). The computational dis-
tance between two distributions D0 and D1 in time t is:
ρc
(D0,D1) (t)4= max
|A|≤t
{
AdvD
0,D1(A)
}
where |A| denotes the running time of A on its inputs.
The ensembles D0 = (D0n) and D1 = (D1n) are computationally indistinguishable in time (tn)
if their computational distance in time (tn) is negligible in n.
In other words, the computational distance is the best advantage that any adversary could get in
bounded time.
Digital signature and games. Let us recall the concept of signature schemes, the security
model that will be considered in the following and to recall in this context the paradigm of games
in which we give a security proof of our scheme.
Definition 6 (Signature Scheme). A signature scheme S is a triple of algorithms Gen, Sgn,
and Vrfy which are defined as:
– The key generation algorithm Gen is a probabilistic algorithm which given 1λ, where λ is the
security parameter, outputs a pair of matching public and private keys (pk, sk);
– The signing algorithm is probabilistic and takes as input a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗ to be signed
and returns a signature σ = Sgnsk(m);
– The verification algorithm takes as input a message m and a signature σ. It returns Vrfypk(m, σ)
which is 1 if the signature is accepted and 0 otherwise. It is required that Vrfypk(m, σ) = 1 if
σ = Sgnsk(m).
For this kind of scheme, one of the strongest security notion is existential unforgeability under an
adaptive chosen message attack (EUF-CMA). In this model the adversary has access to all signa-
tures of its choice and its goal is to produce a valid forgery. A valid forgery is a message/signature
pair (m, σ) such that Vrfypk(m, σ) = 1 whereas the signature of m has never been requested
by the forger. More precisely, the following definition gives the EUF-CMA security of a signature
scheme:
Definition 7 (EUF-CMA Security). Let S be a signature scheme.
A forger A is a (t, qhash, qsign, ε)-adversary in EUF-CMA against S if after at most qhash queries
to the hash oracle, qsign signatures queries and t working time, it outputs a valid forgery with
probability at least ε. We define the EUF-CMA success probability against S as:
SuccEUF-CMAS (t, qhash, qsign)
4
= max (ε|it exists a (t, qhash, qsign, ε)-adversary) .
The signature scheme S is said to be (t, qhash, qsign)-secure in EUF-CMA if the above success
probability is a negligible function of the security parameter λ.
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The game associated to our code-based signature scheme. The modern approach to prove
the security of cryptographic schemes is to relate the security of its primitives to well-known
problems that are believed to be hard by proving that breaking the cryptographic primitives
provides a mean to break one of these hard problems. In our case, the security of the signature
scheme is defined as a game with an adversary that has access to hash and sign oracles. It will be
helpful here to be more formal and to define more precisely the games we will consider. They are
games between two players, an adversary and a challenger. In a game G, the challenger executes
three kind of procedures:
– an initialization procedure Initialize which is called once at the beginning of the game.
– oracle procedures which can be requested at the will of the adversary. In our case, there will
be two, Hash and Sign. The adversary A which is an algorithm may call Hash at most qhash
times and Sign at most qsign times.
– a final procedure Finalize which is executed once A has terminated. The output of A is given
as input to this procedure.
The output of the game G, which is denoted G(A), is the output of the finalization procedure
(which is a bit b ∈ {0, 1}). The game G with A is said to be successful if G(A) = 1. The standard
approach for obtaining a security proof in a certain model is to construct a sequence of games such
that the success of the first game with an adversary A is exactly the success against the model of
security, the difference of the probability of success between two consecutive games is negligible
until the final game where the probability of success is the probability for A to break one of the
problems which is supposed to be hard. In this way, no adversary can break the claim of security
with non-negligible success unless it breaks one of the problems that are supposed to be hard.
Definition 8 (challenger procedures in the EUF-CMA Game). The challenger procedures
for the EUF-CMA Game corresponding to Scode are defined as:
proc Initialize(λ) proc Hash(m, r) proc Sign(m) proc Finalize(m, e, r)
(pk, sk)← Gen(1λ) return h(m, r) r←↩ {0, 1}λ0 s← Hash(m, r)
Hpub ← pk s← Hash(m, r) return
(Hsec,P,S)← sk e← DHsec,w(S−1sT ) HpubeT = sT ∧ |e| = w
return Hpub return (eP, r)
4.2 Code-Based Problems
We introduce in this subsection the code-based problems that will be used in the security proof.
The first is Decoding One Out of Many (DOOM) which was first considered in [JJ02] and later
analyzed in [Sen11]. We will come back to the best known algorithms to solve this problem as a
function of the distance w in §6.
Problem 2 ( DOOM – Decoding One Out of Many).
Instance: H ∈ F(n−k)×n2 , s1, · · · , sq ∈ Fn−k2 , w integer
Output: (e, i) ∈ Fn2 × J1, qK such that |e| = w and HeT = sTi .
Definition 9 (One-Wayness of DOOM). We define the success of an algorithm A against
DOOM with the parameters n, k, q, w as:
Succn,k,q,wDOOM (A) = P
(A (H, s1, · · · , sq) solution of DOOM)
where H is chosen uniformly at random in F(n−k)×n2 , the si’s are chosen uniformly at random in
Fn−k2 and the probability is taken over these choices of H, the si’s and the internal coins of A.
The computational success in time t of breaking DOOM with the parameters n, k, q, w is then
defined as:
Succn,k,q,wDOOM (t) = max|A|≤t
{
Succn,k,q,wDOOM (A)
}
.
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Another problem will appear in the security proof: distinguish random codes from a code drawn
uniformly at random in the family used for public keys in the signature scheme.
Remark 3. We will show in §7.1 (see Theorem 3) that the associated decision problem is NP-
complete.
We will denote in the rest of the article by Hpub the random matrix chosen as the public parity-
check matrix of our scheme. Let us recall that it is obtained as
Hpub = SHsecP with Hsec =
(
HU 0
HV HV
)
, (9)
where S is chosen uniformly at random among the invertible binary matrices of size (n−k)×(n−k),
HU is chosen uniformly at random among the binary matrices of size (n/2 − kU ) × n/2, HV is
chosen uniformly at random among the binary matrices of size (n/2− kV )× n/2 and P is chosen
uniformly at random among the permutation matrices of size n×n. The distribution of the random
variable Hpub is denoted by Dpub. On the other hand Drand will denote the uniform distribution
over the parity-check matrices of all [n, k]-codes with k = kU + kV .
We will discuss about the difficulty of the task to distinguish Dpub and Drand in §7. It should
be noted that the syndromes associated to matrices Hpub are indistinguishable in a very strong
sense from random syndromes as the following proposition shows
Proposition 5. Let DHw be the distribution of the syndromes HeT when e is drawn uniformly at
random among the binary vectors of weight w and U be the uniform distribution over the syndrome
space Fn−k2 . We have
EHpub
(
ρ(DHpubw ,U)
)
≤ 1
2
√
ε
with
ε =
2n−k(
n
w
) + 2n/2−kU (n/2w/2)(n
w
) + ∑
j∈{0,...,w}
j≡w (mod 2)
22j+n/2−kV
(
n/2
(w−j)/2
)2(n/2−(w−j)/2
j
)
(
n/2
j
)(
n
w
)2
2
.
Remark 4. In the paradigm of code-based signatures we have w greater than the Gilbert-Varshamov
bound, which gives 2n−k  (nw) and for the set of parameters we present in §8, ε≪ 12λ with λ
the security parameter.
4.3 EUF-CMA Security Proof
This subsection is devoted to our main theorem and its proof. Let us first introduce some notation
that will be used. We will denote by Dw the distribution
{
DHsec,w(s) : s←↩ Fn−k2
}
where DHsec,w
is the source-distortion decoder used in the signature scheme. Recall that Uw is the uniform
distribution over Sw (which is the set of words of weight w in Fn2 ), Dpub is the distribution of
public keys, Drand is the uniform distribution over parity-check matrices of all [n, k]-codes and
Scode is our signature scheme defined in §3.1 with the family of (U,U + V ) codes.
Theorem 1 (Security Reduction). Let qhash (resp. qsign) be the number of queries to the hash
(resp. signing) oracle. We assume that λ0 = λ+ 2 log2(qsign) where λ is the security parameter of
the signature scheme. We have in the random oracle model (ROM) for all time t:
SuccEUF-CMAScode (t, qhash, qsign) ≤ 2Succn,k,qhash,wDOOM (tc) +
1
2
qhash
√
ε
+ qsignρ (Dw,Uw) + ρc (Drand,Dpub) (tc) + 1
2λ
where tc = t+O
(
qhash · n2
)
and ε given in Proposition 5.
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Proof. Let A be a (t, qsign, qhash, ε)-adversary in the EUF-CMA model against Scode and let
(H0, s1, · · · , sqhash) be drawn uniformly at random among all instances of DOOM for parame-
ters n, k, qhash, w. We stress here that syndromes sj are random and independent vectors of Fn−k2 .
We write P (Si) to denote the probability of success for A of game Gi. Let
Game 0 is the EUF-CMA game for Scode.
Game 1 is identical to Game 0 unless the following failure event F occurs: there is a collision
in a signature query (i.e. two signatures queries for a same message m lead to the same salt r).
By using the difference lemma (see for instance [Sho04, Lemma 1]) we get:
P (S0) ≤ P (S1) + P (F ) .
The following lemma (see A.2 for a proof) shows that in our case as λ0 = λ+ 2 log2(qsign), the
probability of the event F is negligible.
Lemma 1. For λ0 = λ+ 2 log2(qsign) we have:
P (F ) ≤ 1
2λ
.
Game 2 is modified from Game 1 as follows:
proc Hash(m, r) proc Sign(m)
if r ∈ Lm r← Lm.next()
em,r ←↩ Sw s← Hash(m, r)
return em,rH
T
pub e← DHsec,w(S−1sT )
else return (eP, r)
j ← j + 1
return sj
To each message m we associate a list Lm containing
qsign random elements of Fλ02 . It is constructed the
first time it is needed. The call r ∈ Lm returns true if
and only if r is in the list. The call Lm.next() returns
elements of Lm sequentially. The list is large enough
to satisfy all queries.
The Hash procedure now creates the list Lm if needed, then, if r ∈ Lm it returns em,rHTpub with
em,r ←↩ Sw. This leads to a valid signature (em,r, r) for m. The error value is stored. If r 6∈ Lm it
outputs one of sj of the instance (H0, s1, . . . , sqhash) of the DOOM problem. The Sign procedure
is unchanged, except for r which is now taken in Lm. The global index j is set to 0 in proc
Initialize.
We can relate this game to the previous one through the following lemma.
Lemma 2.
P(S1) ≤ P(S2) + qhash
2
√
ε where ε is given in Proposition 5.
The proof of this lemma is given in Appendix A.3 and relies among other things on the following
points:
– Proposition 4;
– Syndromes produced by matrices Hpub with errors of weight w have average statistical distance
from the uniform distribution over Fn−k2 at most 12
√
ε (see Proposition 5). This follows from
a lemma which is a variation of the leftover hash lemma (see [BDK+11]) and which can be
expressed as follows.
– Lemma 3. Consider a finite family H = (hi)i∈I of functions from a finite set E to a finite
set F . Denote by ε the bias of the collision probability, i.e. the quantity such that
Ph,e,e′(h(e) = h(e′)) =
1
|F | (1 + ε)
where h is drawn uniformly at random in H, e and e′ are drawn uniformly at random in E.
Let U be the uniform distribution over F and D(h) be the distribution of the outputs h(e) when
e is chosen uniformly at random in E. We have
Eh {ρ(D(h),U)} ≤ 1
2
√
ε.
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Remark 5. In the leftover hash lemma, there is the additional assumption that H is a universal
family of hash functions, meaning that for any e and e′ distinct in F , we have Ph(h(e) =
h(e′)) = 1|F | . This assumption allows to have a general bound on the bias ε. In our case,
where the h’s are hash functions defined as h(e) = Hpube
T , H does not form a universal
family of hash functions (essentially because the distribution of the Hpub’s is not the uniform
distribution over F(n−k)×n2 ). However in our case we can still bound ε by a direct computation.
This lemma is proved in Appendix §A.3.
Game 3 differs from Game 2 by changing in proc Sign calls “e ← DHsec,w(S−1sT )” by
“e← em,r” and “return (eP, r)” by “return (e, r)”. Any signature (e, r) produced by proc Sign
is valid. The error e is drawn according to the uniform distribution Uw while previously it was
drawn according to the source distortion decoder distribution, that is Dw. By using Proposition 4
it follows that
P (S2) ≤ P (S3) + qsignρ (Uw,Dw) .
Game 4 is the game where we replace the public matrix Hpub by H0. In this way we will force
the adversary to build a solution of the DOOM problem. Here if a difference is detected between
games it gives a distinguisher between distributions Drand and Dpub:
P (S3) ≤ P (S4) + ρc (Dpub,Drand) (tc) .
We show in appendix how to emulate the lists Lm in such a way that list operations cost,
including its construction, is at most linear in the security parameter λ. Since λ ≤ n, it follows
that the cost to a call to proc Hash cannot exceed O(n2) and the running time of the challenger
is tc = t+O
(
qhash · n2
)
.
Game 5 differs in the finalize procedure.
proc Finalize(m, e, r)
s← Hash(m, r)
b← HpubeT = sT ∧ |e| = w
return b ∧ r /∈ Lm
We assume the forger outputs a valid signature (e, r) for the mes-
sage m. The probability of success of Game 5 is the probability of
the event “S4 ∧ (r 6∈ Lm)”.
If the forgery is valid, the message m has never been queried by Sign, and the adversary never
had access to any element of the list Lm. This way, the two events are independent and we get:
P (S5) = (1− 2−λ0)qsignP (S4) .
As we assumed λ0 = λ+ 2 log2(qsign) ≥ log2(q2sign), we have:
(
1− 2−λ0)qsign ≥ (1− 1
q2sign
)qsign
≥ 1
2
.
Therefore
P (S5) ≥ 1
2
P (S4) . (10)
The probability P (S5) is then exactly the probability forA to output ej ∈ Sw such that H0eTj = sTj
for some j which gives
P (S5) ≤ Succn,k,qhash,wDOOM (tc). (11)
(10) together with (11) imply that
P(S4) ≤ 2 · Succn,k,qhash,wDOOM (tc).
This concludes the proof of Theorem 1 by combining this together with all the bounds obtained
for each of the previous games.
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5 Achieving the Uniform Distribution of the Outputs
5.1 Rejection Sampling Method
In our security proof, we use the fact that the distribution of the outputs of the (U,U+V ) decoder
is close to the uniform distribution on the words of weight w. We will show how to modify a little
bit the decoder by performing some moderate rejection sampling in order to meet this property.
Note that ensuring such a property is actually not only desirable for the security proof, it is
also more or less necessary since there is an easy way to attack the signature when it is based
on the decoder UV -sddV1. Indeed, it is readily verified that with this decoder the probability
P(ei = 1, ej = 1) we have on the output e of the decoder for certain i and j is larger than the same
probability for a random word e of weight w. The pairs (i, j) which have this property correspond
to the image by the permutation P of pairs of the form (x, x+n/2) or (x+n/2, x). In other words,
signatures leak information in this case and this can be used to recover completely the permuted
(U,U + V ) structure of the code.
To explain the rejection method, let us introduce some notation. Let e ∈ Fn2 ,
w1(e)
4
=
∣∣{i ∈ {1, · · · , n/2} : ei 6= ei+n/2}∣∣ ,
w2(e)
4
=
∣∣{i ∈ {1, · · · , n/2} : ei = ei+n/2 = 1}∣∣ .
The problem is that algorithm UV -sddV1 outputs errors e for which w1(e) and w2(e) are
constant: w1(e) = (n/2 − kV )/2 and w2(e) = (n/2 − kU − w1(e))/2 = n/8 − kU/2 + kV /4.
Obviously uniformly distributed errors e in Sw do not have this behavior. Our strategy to attain
this uniform distribution on the outputs e is to change a little bit the source-distortion decoder for
V in order to attain variable weight errors which are such that the weight of eV (which corresponds
to w1(e)) have the same distribution as w1(e
′) where e′ is a random error of weight w which is
uniformly distributed. This can be easily done by rejection sampling as in Algorithm 2. Recall
that D is a Source Distortion Decoder (see Definition 1 in §3.2).
Algorithm 2 UV -sddV2 : (U,U + V )−Source Distortion Decoder
Parameter: a (U,U + V ) code of length n
Inputs: · (s1, s2) with s1 ∈ Fn/2−kU2 , s2 ∈ Fn/2−kV2
· no-rejection probability vector x = (xi)0≤i≤n−kV ∈ [0, 1]n−kV
Output: e ∈ Fn2 with |e| = w.
Assumes: 2kU − kV ≤ n/2.
1: repeat
2: eV ← D(HV , s2)
3: p←↩ [0, 1]
4: until |eV | ≤ w, w − |eV | ≡ 0 (mod 2) and p ≤ x|eV |
5: eU ← D(w−|eV |)/2(HU , s1, eV )
6: return (eU , eU + eV )
From now on we consider two random variables : e which is the output of Algorithm 2 and
e′ which is a uniformly distributed error of weight w. It is easily verified that w1(e) = |eV | and
w2(e) = (w − |eV |)/2. Moreover, it turns out that it is not only necessary in order to achieve
uniform distribution on the output to enforce that w1(e) follows the same law as w1(e
′), this is
also sufficient. To check this, let us introduce some additional notation. For i ∈ {1, 2} we define
the quantities
psddi (j)
4
=Pe (wi(e) = j) ; pui (j)
4
=Pe′ (wi(e′) = j)
We will also say that a source distortion decoder D behaves uniformly for a parity-check matrix
H if Ps,θ (e = D(H, s)) only depends on the weight |e| (here θ denotes the internal randomness of
algorithm D).
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In such a case, the no-rejection vector x can be chosen so that the output of Algorithm 2 is
uniformly distributed as shown by the following theorem.
Theorem 2. If the source decoder D used in Algorithm 2 behaves uniformly for HV and uniformly
for H′′U which is obtained from (HU , eV ) in Proposition 2 (see §3.2) for all error patterns eV
obtained as eV = D(HV , s2), we have:
ρ (Dw,Uw) = ρ
(
psdd1 , p
u
1
)
where Dw is the output distribution of Algorithm 2. Then, output of Algorithm 2 is the uniform
distribution over Sw if in addition two executions of D are independent and the no-rejection
probability vector x is chosen for any i in {0, . . . , w} as
xi =
1
Mrs
pu1 (i)
p(i)
if w ≡ i (mod 2) xi = 0 otherwise
with p(i)
4
=Ps,θ(|D(HV , s)| = i) and Mrs 4= sup
0≤i≤w
i≡w (mod 2)
pu1 (i)
p(i) .
5.2 Application to the Prange source distortion decoder.
The Prange source decoder (defined in §3.2) is extremely close to behave uniformly for almost all
linear codes. To keep this paper within a reasonable length we just provide here how the relevant
distribution p(i) is computed.
Proposition 6 (Weight Distribution of the Prange Algorithm).
Let p(i) =
∑
e:|e|=i Ps,θ
(
e = DPrange(H, s)
)
. For all w, k, n ∈ N with k ≤ n, w ≤ n − k, all
parity-check matrices of size (n− k)× n, we have p(w) = (
n−k
w )
2n−k .
By using Theorem 2 with this distribution p we can set up the no-rejection probability vector x
in Algorithm 2. To have an efficient algorithm it is essential that the parameter Mrs is as small as
possible (it is readily verified that the average number of calls in Algorithm 2 to DPrange(HV , s2)
is Mrs). Let e be an error of weight w chosen uniformly at random. This average number of calls
can be chosen to be small by imposing that the distributions of w1(e) and |D(HV , s2)| to have
the same expectation. The expectation of w1(e) is approximately w
(
1− wn
)
and the expectation
of |D(HV , s2)| is (n/2− kV )/2. We choose therefore kV such that
(n/2− kV )/2 ≈ w
(
1− w
n
)
.
Thanks to this property, kV is chosen to “align” both distributions and in this way Mrs is small.
This rejection sampling method comes at the price of slightly increasing the weight the decoder
can output as it is shown in Figure 4. It is easy to see that the optimal choice of the parameters
kU , kV , w minimizing Mrs for given n, R
4
= k/n leads to the following choice:
w = bn3−
√
1 + 8R
4
c, kU = n/2− w, kV = bn/2− 2w
(
1− w
n
)
c.
For instance for n = 2000, k = 1000, we have w = 382, kU = 618, kV = 382 and Mrs ≈ 2.54.
Recall that the relative weight of an error e ∈ Fn2 is defined as |e|n . Figure 4 gives the relative error
weight as a function of R of Algorithm UV -sddV2 (with rejection sampling), Algorithm UV -
sddV1 (without rejection sampling), the relative weight which is achieved by a generic decoder
1−R
2 and the relative Gilbert-Varshamov bound h
−1(1 − R). For instance with R = 0.5 we have
w = b0.1909nc.
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Fig. 4. Comparison of the Optimal Signature Distortion with or without the Rejection Sampling Method,
the Gilbert-Varshamov Bound and the Generic Distortion
6 Best Known Algorithms for Solving the DOOM Decoding Problem
We consider here the best known techniques for solving Problem 2.
Problem 2. [DOOM – Decoding One Out of Many]
Instance: H ∈ F(n−k)×n2 , s1, · · · , sq ∈ Fn−k2 , w integer
Output: (e, i) ∈ Fn2 × J1, qK such that |e| = w and HeT = sTi .
When q = 1, Problem 2 is known as the Syndrome Decoding (SD) problem. Information Set
Decoding (ISD) is the best known technique to solve SD, it can be traced back to Prange [Pra62].
It has been improved in [Ste88, Dum91] by introducing a birthday paradox. The current state-of-
the-art can be found in [MMT11, BJMM12, MO15]. The DOOM problem was first considered in
[JJ02] then analyzed in [Sen11] for Dumer’s variant of ISD.
Existing literature usually assumes that there is a unique solution to the problem. This is
true when w is smaller than the Gilbert-Varshamov bound (see Definition 2). When w is larger,
as it is the case here, we speak of source-distortion decoding, the number of solutions grows as
M =
(
n
w
)
/2n−k and the cost analysis must be adapted. Considering multiple instances, as in
DOOM above, also alters the cost analysis.
From this point and till the end of this section, the parameters n, k, w are fixed.
6.1 Why Does DOOM Strengthen the Security Proof?
An attacker may produce many, say q, favorable messages and hash them to obtain s1, . . . , sq
submitted to a solver of Problem 2 together with the public key H and the signature weight
w. The output of the solver will produce a valid signature for one of the q messages. In the
security reduction, the assumption related to DOOM is precisely the same, that is assuming key
indistinguishability and a proper distribution of the signatures, the adversary has to solve an
instance of DOOM as described above and the reduction is tight in this respect.
The usual Full Domain Hash (FDH) proof for existential forgery would use SD rather than
DOOM and to guaranty a security parameter λ, the cost of SD, denoted WF, has to be at least
q2λ where q ≤ 2λ is the number of hash queries. This would require code parameters (n, k, w) such
that WF ≥ 22λ. Instead we only require the cost of DOOM to be at least 2λ, and even though
DOOM is easier than SD, this will provide a tighter bound and allow smaller parameters.
We denote by WF1−δ the workfactor of DOOM when q can be as large as allowed. It is
shown in [Sen11] that solving DOOM with ISD with q instances cannot cost less than WF/
√
q,
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corresponding to δ = 0.33 and a choice of parameters such that WF ≥ 21.5λ. In practice, the
situation is more favorable. When decoding codes of rate k/n = 1/2 at the Gilbert-Varshamov
bound (w = 0.11n), for Dumer’s variant of ISD we get δ ≤ 0.25 and WF ≥ 21.32λ. When w
grows, the situation is even better, for a rate 1/2 and w = 0.19n (the signature parameters) we
get δ ≈ 0.07 and WF ≥ 21.08λ.
Finally, this means that using state-of-the-art solutions for DOOM, we only need to increase
the code size by 8% compared with SD’s requirement, whereas the usual proof would require to
double the parameters. The rest of this section is devoted to a detailed analysis leading to this
conclusion.
6.2 ISD – Information Set Decoding
The ISD algorithm for solving DOOM is sketched in Algorithm 3. In all variants of ISD, the
Algorithm 3 (generalized) ISD
1: input: H ∈ F(n−k)×n2 , s1, . . . , sq ∈ Fn−k2 , w integer
2: loop
3: pick an n× n permutation matrix P
4: perform partial Gaussian elimination on HP
UHP =
0
In−k−`
H′
H′′
6
6
?
?
`
n− k − `
UsTi =
s′′i
T
s′i
T
i = 1, . . . , q
5: compute E = {(e′, i) ∈ Fk+`2 × J1, qK | H′e′T = s′i, |e′| = p}, H′ ∈ F`×(k+`)2
6: for all (e′, i) ∈ E do
7: e′′ ← e′H′′T + s′′i ; e← (e′′, e′)PT
8: if |e| = w then return (e, i)
computation of the set E (Instruction 5) dominates the cost of one loop of Algorithm 3, we denote
it by Cq(p, `). As it is described, the loop is repeated until a solution is found. The standard version
corresponds to a single instance, that is q = 1. Below we explain how the cost estimate of the
algorithm varies in various situations: when we have a single instance and a single solution, when
the number of solutions increases and when the number of instances (q) increases. For each value
of n, k, w and q, the algorithm is optimized over the parameters p and `. The optimal values of p
and ` will change with the number of solutions and the number of instances.
Single Instance and Single Solution. We consider a situation where we wish to estimate the
cost of the algorithm for producing one specific solution of Problem 2 with q = 1. In that case, even
when w is large and there are multiple solutions, the solution we are looking for, say e, is returned
if and only if the permutation P is such that |e′| = p and |e′′| = w − p where (e′′, e′)← eP. This
will happen with probability P(p, `) leading to the workfactor WF(1)
P(p, `) =
(
n−k−`
w−p
)(
k+`
p
)(
n
w
) ,WF(1) = min
p,`
C1(p, `)
P(p, `) ,
which is obtained by solving an optimization problem over p and `. The exact expression of
C1(p, `) depends on the variant, for instance, for Dumer’s algorithm [Dum91] we have C1(p, `) =
max
(√(
k+`
p
)
,
(
k+`
p
)
2−`
)
up to a small polynomial factor. For more involved variants [BJMM12,
MO15], the value of C1(p, `) is, for each (p, `), the solution of another optimization problem.
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Single Instance and Multiple Solutions. We now consider a situation where there are M
solutions to a syndrome decoding problem (q = 1). If w is larger than the Gilbert-Varshamov bound
we expect M =
(
n
w
)
/2n−k else M = 1. Assuming each of the M solutions can be independently
produced, the probability that one particular iteration produces (at least) one of the solutions
becomes PM (p, `) = 1− (1− P(p, `))M . The corresponding workfactor is
WF(M) = min
p,`
C1(p, `)
PM (p, `) .
Let (p0, `0) be the optimal value of the pair (p, `) for a single solution.
Case 1: P(p0, `0) ≤ 1/M . We have PM (p0, `0) = 1− (1− P(p0, `0))M ≥ e−1MP(p0, `0) and thus
WF(M) = min
p,`
C1(p, `)
PM (p, `) ≤
C1(p0, `0)
PM (p0, `0) ≤
e
M
C1(p0, `0)
P(p0, `0) =
e
M
WF(1).
Also remark that PM (p, `) ≤ MP(p, `) and thus WF(M) ≥ WF(1)/M . In other words, up to a
small constant factor, the workfactor for multiple solutions is simply obtained by dividing the
single solution workfactor by the number of solutions.
Case 2: P(p0, `0) > 1/M . In this case the success probability PM (p0, `0) < MP(p0, `0) and the
pair (p, `) that minimizes the workfactor is going to be different. We observe that the gain is much
less than the factor M of Case 1.
In practice, and for the parameters we consider in this work, we are always in Case 2. In fact,
for k/n = 0.5, with Dumer’s algorithm Case 1 only applies when w/n < 0.150, while the Gilbert-
Varshamov bound corresponds to w/n = 0.110. With BJMM’s algorithm, Case 1 only happens
when w/n ≤ 0.117. In our signature scheme we have w/n ≈ 0.19 and we always fall in Case 2,
even with a single instance.
Multiples Instances with Multiple Solutions. We now consider the case where the adversary
has access to q instances for the same matrix H and various syndromes. This is the Problem 2 that
appears in the security reduction. For each instance, we expect M = max
(
1,
(
n
w
)
/2n−k
)
solutions.
As before, the cost is dominated by Instruction 5, we denote it by Cq(p, `), and the probability
of success is PqM (p, `) = 1− (1− P(p, `))qM . The overall cost has to be minimized over p and `
WF(M)q = min
p,`
Cq(p, `)
PqM (p, `) .
Indeed how to compute E , and thus the value of Cq(p, `), is not specified in Algorithm 3. This is
in fact what [JJ02, Sen11] are about. For instance with Dumer’s algorithm, we have [Sen11]
Cq(p, `) = max
(√
q
(
k+`
p
)
,
q
(
k+`
p
)
2`
)
, q ≤
(
k + `
p
)
up to a small polynomial factor. Introducing multiple instances in advanced variants of ISD has
not been done so far and is an open problem. We give in Table 1 the asymptotic exponent for
various decoding distances and for the code rate 0.5. The third column gives the largest useful
value of q. It is likely that BJMM’s algorithm will have a slightly lower exponent when addressing
multiple instances. Note that for Dumer’s algorithm in this range of parameters, the improvement
from WF(M) (single instance) to WF(M)q (multiple instances) is relatively small, there is no reason
to expect a much different behavior for BJMM.
Finally, let us mention that the best asymptotic exponent among all known decoding techniques
was proposed in [MO15]. However it is penalized by a big polynomial overhead which makes it
more expensive at this point for the sizes considered here.
28 Thomas Debris-Alazard, Nicolas Sendrier, and Jean-Pierre Tillich
Dumer BJMM
w/n 1
n
log2M
1
n
log2 q
1
n
log2 WF
(M)
q
1
n
log2 WF
(M) 1
n
log2 WF
(M)
0.11 0.0000 0.0872 0.0872 0.1152 0.1000
0.15 0.1098 0.0448 0.0448 0.0535 0.0486
0.19 0.2015 0.0171 0.0171 0.0184 0.0175
Table 1. Asymptotic Exponent for Algorithm 3 for k/n = 0.5
6.3 Other Decoding Techniques.
As mentioned in [CJ04, FS09], the Generalized Birthday Algorithm (GBA) [Wag02] is a relevant
technique to solve decoding problems, in particular when there are multiple solutions. However, it
is competitive only when the ratio k/n tends to 1, and does not apply here. We refer the reader
to [MS09] for more details on GBA and its usage.
7 Distinguishing a permuted (U,U + V ) code
We discuss in this section how hard it is to decide whether a given linear code is a permuted
(U,U + V )-code or not and give the best algorithm we have found to perform this task. This
algorithm is based on a series of works on related problems [OT11, LT13, GHPT17].
7.1 NP-completeness
The key security of our scheme primarily relies on the problem of deciding whether a linear code
is a permuted (U,U + V ) code or not, namely:
Problem 3. ( (U,U + V )-distinguishing)
Instance: A binary linear code C and an integer kU ,
Question: Is there a permutation pi of length n such that pi(C) is a (U,U + V )-code
where dim(U) = kU and |Supp(V )| = n/2?
Here the support of V is defined as the union of the support of its codewords. More precisely
the support of a vector x = (xi)1≤i≤n ∈ Fn2 is defined as:
Supp(x)
4
={i ∈ J1, nK : xi 6= 0}
and if C denotes a code, we define its support as:
Supp(C)4=
⋃
c∈C
Supp(c).
It turns out that this problem is NP-complete:
Theorem 3. The (U,U + V )-distinguishing problem is NP-complete.
This theorem is proved in Appendix §C.2.
Moreover, even a weaker version of this problem still stays NP-complete. This problem is
related to the output of Algorithm 4 that we will give in Subsection 7.3. It is an algorithm that
recovers in a permuted (U,U + V )-code the positions that belong to the support of the V -code.
This allows to reorder the positions of the public code such that the first half is a permutation
of the first n/2 positions of the (U,U + V )-code whereas the second half is a permutation of the
n/2 last positions of the (U,U + V )-code. Note that we just have to reorder the second half so
that it corresponds to a valid (U,U + V ) code (where the new U -code is a permutation of the old
U -code). In other words the problem we have to solve is the following.
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Problem 4. Let U and V be two binary linear codes of length n/2 and let pi be a permutation of
length n/2. Let
(U, pi(U) + V )
4
={(u, pi(u) + v),u ∈ U,v ∈ V }.
Find a permutation pi′ acting on the right-hand part which gives to (U, pi(U)+V ) the structure of a
(U,U+V )-code, i.e. find pi′ a permutation of length n/2 such that (U, pi′(pi(U)+V )) = (U,U+V ′)
for a certain binary linear code V ′, where
(U, pi′(pi(U) + V ))
4
={(u, pi′(pi(u) + v)),u ∈ U,v ∈ V }.
Remark 6. pi′ = pi−1 is a solution to this problem but there might be other solutions of course.
The decision problem which is related to this search version is the following.
Problem 5 (Problem P2’: weak (U,U + V )-distinguishing). Consider a binary linear code C of
length n where n is even. Do there exist two binary linear codes U and V of length n/2 and a
permutation pi of length n/2 such that
(U,U + V ) = {(x, pi(y)) : (x,y) ∈ C,x ∈ Fn/22 ,y ∈ Fn/22 }.
This problem can be viewed as Problem P2 where we have some side information available
where we have been revealed the split of the support of the (U,U +V ) construction in the left and
the right part, but the left part and the right part have been permuted “internally”. It turns out
that this decision problem is already NP-complete
Theorem 4. The weak-(U,U + V ) distinguishing Problem P2’ is an NP-complete problem.
The proof of this theorem is also given in Appendix §C.2.
7.2 Main idea used in the algorithms distinguishing or recovering the structure of
a (U,U + V )-code we present here
A (U,U + V ) code where U and V are random seems very close to a random linear code. There is
for instance only a very slight difference between the weight distribution of a random linear code
and the weight distribution of a random (U,U + V )-code of the same length and dimension. This
slight difference happens for small and large weights and is due to codewords of the form (u,u)
where u belongs to U or codewords of the form (0,v) where v belongs to V . More precisely, we
have the following proposition
Proposition 7. Assume that we choose a (U,U+V ) code by picking the parity-check matrices of U
and V uniformly at random among the binary matrices of size (n/2−kU )×n/2 and (n/2−kV )×n/2
respectively. Let a(U,U+V )(w), a(U,U)(w) and a(0,V )(w) be the expected number of codewords of
weight w that are respectively in the (U,U + V ) code, of the form (u,u) where u belongs to U and
of the form (0,v) where v belongs to V . These numbers are given for even w in {0, . . . , n} by
a(U,U+V )(w) =
(
n/2
w/2
)
2n/2−kU
+
(
n/2
w
)
2n/2−kV
+
1
2n−kU−kV
((
n
w
)
−
(
n/2
w
)
−
(
n/2
w/2
))
a(U,U)(w) =
(
n/2
w/2
)
2n/2−kU
; a(0,V )(w) =
(
n/2
w
)
2n/2−kV
and for odd w in {0, . . . , n} by
a(U,U+V )(w) =
(
n/2
w
)
2n/2−kV
+
1
2n−kU−kV
((
n
w
)
−
(
n/2
w
))
a(U,U)(w) = 0 ; a(0,V )(w) =
(
n/2
w
)
2n/2−kV
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On the other hand, when we choose a code of length n with a random parity-check matrix of size
(n − kU − kV ) × n chosen uniformly at random, then the expected number a(w) of codewords of
weight w > 0 is given by
a(w) =
(
n
w
)
2n−kU−kV
.
Remark 7. When the (U,U+V ) code is chosen in this way, its dimension is kU+kV with probability
1−O (max(2kU−n/2, 2kV −n/2)). This also holds for the random codes of length n.
We have plotted in Figure 5 the normalized logarithm of the density of codewords of the form
(u,u) and (0,v) of relative even weight x
4
= wn against x in the case U is of rate
kU
n/2 = 0.6 and V
is of rate kVn/2 = 0.4. These two relative densities are defined respectively by
α(U,U)(w/n) =
log2(a(U,U)(w)/a(w))
n
; α(0,V )(w/n) =
log2(a(0,V )(w)/a(w))
n
We see that for a relative weight w/n below approximately 0.18 almost all the codewords are of
the form (0,v) in this case.
Fig. 5. α(U,U)(w/n) and α(0,V )(w/n) against x
4
= w
n
.
Since the weight distribution is invariant by permuting the positions, this slight difference also
survives in the permuted version of (U,U + V ). These considerations lead to the best attack we
have found for recovering the structure of a permuted (U,U + V ) code. It consists in applying
known algorithms aiming at recovering low weight codewords in a linear code. We run such an
algorithm until getting at some point either a permuted (u,u) codeword where u is in U or a
permuted (0,v) codeword where v belongs to V . The rationale behind this algorithm is that the
density of codewords of the form (u,u) or (0,v) is bigger when the weight of the codeword gets
smaller.
Once we have such a codeword we can bootstrap from there very similarly to what has been
done in [OT11, Subs. 4.4]. Note that this attack is actually very close in spirit to the attack that
was devised on the KKS signature scheme [OT11]. In essence, the attack against the KKS scheme
really amounts to recover the support of the V code. The difference with the KKS scheme is that
the support of V is much bigger in our case. As explained in the conclusion of [OT11] the attack
against the KKS scheme has in essence an exponential complexity. This exponent becomes really
prohibitive in our case when the parameters of U and V are chosen appropriately as we will now
explain.
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7.3 Recovering the V code up to a permutation
The aforementioned attack recovers V up to some permutation of the positions. In a first step it
recovers a basis of
V ′
4
=(0, V )P = {(0,v)P : v ∈ V }.
Once this is achieved, the support Supp(V ′) of V ′ can be obtained. Recall that this is the set
of positions for which there exists at least one codeword of V ′ that is non-zero in this position.
This allows to recover the code V up to some permutation. The basic algorithm for recovering the
support of V ′ and a basis of V ′ is given in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 ComputeV: algorithm that computes a set of independent elements in V ′.
Parameters: (i) ` : small integer (` 6 40),
(ii) p : very small integer (typically 1 6 p 6 10).
Input: (i) Cpub the public code used for verifying signatures.
(ii) N a certain number of iterations
Output: an independent set of elements in V ′
1: function ComputeV(Cpub,N)
2: for i = 1, . . . , N do
3: B ← ∅
4: Choose a set I ⊂ {1, . . . , n} of size n− k − ` uniformly at random
5: L ← Codewords(PuncI(Cpub), p)
6: for all x ∈ L do
7: x← Complete(x, I, Cpub)
8: if CheckV(x) then
9: add x to B if x /∈< B >
10: return B
It uses other auxiliary functions
– Codewords(PuncI(Cpub), p) which computes all (or a big fraction of) codewords of weight p of
the punctured public code PuncI(Cpub). All modern [Dum91, FS09, MMT11, BJMM12, MO15]
algorithms for decoding linear codes perform such a task in their inner loop.
– Complete(x, I, Cpub) which computes the codeword c in Cpub such that its restriction outside
I is equal to x.
– CheckV(x) which checks whether x belongs to V ′.
Choosing N appropriately. Let us first analyze how we have to choose N such that ComputeV
returns Ω(1) elements. This is essentially the analysis which can be found in [OT11, Subsec 5.2].
This analysis leads to
Proposition 8. The probability Psucc that one iteration of the for loop (Instruction 2) in Algo-
rithm 4 adds elements to the list B is lower-bounded by
Psucc ≥
n/2∑
w=0
(
n/2
w
)(
n/2
n−k−`−w
)(
n
n−k−`)
) f ((n/2− w
p
)
2kV +w−n/2
)
(12)
where f is the function defined by f(x)
4
= max
(
x(1− x/2), 1− 1x
)
. Algorithm 4 returns a non zero
list with probability Ω(1) when N is chosen as N = Ω
(
1
Psucc
)
.
Proof. It will be helpful to recall [OT11, Lemma 3]
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Lemma 4. Choose a random code Crand of length n from a parity-check matrix of size r×n chosen
uniformly at random in Fr×n2 . Let X be some subset of Fn2 of size m. We have
P(X ∩ Crand 6= ∅) ≥ f
(m
2r
)
.
To lower-bound the probability Psucc that an iteration is successful, we bring in the following
random variables
I ′
4
= I ∩ Supp(I ′′) and W 4= |I ′|
where I ′′ is the set of positions that are of the images of the permutation P of the n/2 last positions.
ComputeV outputs at least one element of V ′ if there is an element of weight p in PuncI′(V ′).
Therefore the probability of success Psucc is given by
Psucc =
n/2∑
w=0
P(W = w)P (∃x ∈ V ′ : |xI¯′ | = p | W = w) (13)
where I¯ ′
4
= Supp(V ′) \ I ′. On the other hand, by using Lemma 4 with the set
X
4
=
{
x = (xj)j∈Supp(V ′) : |xI¯′ | = p
}
which is of size
(
n/2−w
p
)
2w, we obtain
P (∃x ∈ V ′ : |xI¯′ | = p|W = w) ≥ f(x). (14)
with
x
4
=
(
n/2−w
p
)
2w
2n/2−kV
=
(
n/2− w
p
)
2kV +w−n/2
The first quantity is clearly equal to
P(W = w) =
(
n/2
w
)(
n/2
n−k−`−w
)(
n
n−k−`
) . (15)
Plugging in the expressions obtained in (14) and (15) in (13) we have an explicit expression of a
lower bound on Psucc
Psucc ≥
n/2∑
w=0
(
n/2
w
)(
n/2
n−k−`−w
)(
n
n−k−`)
) f ((n/2− w
p
)
2kV +w−n/2
)
(16)
The claim on the number N of iterations follows directly from this. uunionsq
Complexity of recovering a permuted version of V . The complexity of a call to ComputeV
can be estimated as follows. The complexity of computing the list of codewords of weight p in a
code of length k + ` and dimension k is equal to C1(p, `) (this quantity is introduced in §6). It
depends on the particular algorithm used here [Dum91, FS09, MMT11, BJMM12, MO15]. This
is the complexity of the call Codewords(PuncI(Cpub), p) in Step 5 in Algorithm 4. The complexity
of ComputeV and hence the complexity of recovering a permuted version of V is clearly lower
bounded by Ω
(
C1(p,`)
Psucc
)
. It turns out that the whole complexity of recovering a permuted version
of V is actually of this order, namely Θ
(
C1(p,`)
Psucc
)
. This can be done by a combination of two
techniques
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– Once a non-zero element of V ′ has been identified, it is much easier to find other ones. This
uses one of the tricks for breaking the KKS scheme (see [OT11, Subs. 4.4]). The point is the
following: if we start again the procedure ComputeV, but this time by choosing a set I on which
we puncture the code which contains the support of the codeword that we already found, then
the number N of iterations that we have to perform until finding a new element is negligible
when compared to the original value of N .
– The call to CheckV can be implemented in such a way that the additional complexity coming
from all the calls to this function is of the same order as the N calls to Codewords. The strategy
to adopt depends on the values of the dimensions k and kV . In certain cases, it is easy to detect
such codewords since they have a typical weight that is significantly smaller than the other
codewords. In more complicated cases, we might have to combine a technique checking first
the weight of x, if it is above some prescribed threshold, we decide that it is not in V ′, if it is
below the threshold, we decide that it is a suspicious candidate and use then the previous trick.
We namely check whether the support of the codeword x can be used to find other suspicious
candidates much more quickly than performing N calls to CheckV.
To keep the length of this paper within some reasonable limit we avoid here giving the analysis of
those steps and we will just use the aforementioned lower bound on the complexity of recovering
a permuted version of V .
7.4 Recovering the U code up to permutation
We consider here the permuted code
U ′
4
=(U,U)P = {(u,u)P : u ∈ U}.
The attack in this case consists in recovering a basis of U ′. Once this is done, it is easy to recover
the U code up to permutation by matching the pairs of coordinates which are equal in U ′. The
algorithm for recovering U ′ is the same as the algorithm for recovering V ′. We call the associated
function ComputeU though since they differ in the choice for N . The analysis is slightly different
indeed.
Choosing N appropriately. As in the previous subsection let us analyze how we have to choose
N in order that ComputeU returns Ω(1) elements of U ′. We have in this case the following result.
Proposition 9. The probability Psucc that one iteration of the for loop (Instruction 2) in Com-
puteU adds elements to the list B is lower-bounded by
Psucc ≥
n/2∑
w=0
(
n/2
w
)(
n/2−w
k+`−2w
)
2k+`−2w(
n
k+`
) bp/2cmax
i=0
f
( (
k+`−2w
p−2i
)(
w
i
)
2max(0,k+`−w−kU )
)
(17)
where f is the function defined by f(x)
4
= max
(
x(1− x/2), 1− 1x
)
. ComputeU returns a non zero
list with probability Ω(1) when N is chosen as N = Ω
(
1
Psucc
)
.
Proof. Here the crucial notion is the concept of matched positions. We say that two positions i
and j are matched if and only if ci = cj for every c ∈ U ′. There are clearly n/2 pairs of matched
positions. W will now be defined by the number of matched pairs that are included in {1, . . . , n}\I.
We compute the probability of success as before by conditioning on the values taken by W :
Psucc =
n/2∑
w=0
P(W = w)P (∃x ∈ U ′ : |xI¯ | = p |W = w) (18)
where I¯
4
={1, . . . , n}\I. Notice that we can partition I¯ as I¯ = J1∪J2 where J2 consists in the union
of the matched pairs in I¯. Note that |J2| = 2w. We may further partition J2 as J2 = J21 ∪ J22
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where the elements of a matched pair are divided into the two sets. In other words, neither J21
nor J22 contains a matched pair. We are going to consider the codes
U”
4
= Punc
I
(U ′)
U ′′′
4
= Punc
I∪J22
(U ′)
The last code is of length k + `− w. The point of defining the first code is that
P (∃x ∈ U ′ : |xI¯ | = p | W = w)
is equal to the probability that U” contains a codeword of weight p. The problem is that we can
not apply Lemma 4 to it due to the matched positions it contains. This is precisely the point of
defining U ′′′. In this case, we can consider that it is a random code whose parity-check matrix is
chosen uniformly at random among the set of matrices of size max(0, k+ `−w−kU )× (k+ `−w).
We can therefore apply Lemma 4 to it. We have to be careful about the words of weight p in
U” though, since they do not have the same probability of occurring in U” due to the possible
presence of matched pairs in the support. This is why we introduce for i in {0, . . . , bp/2c} the sets
Xi defined as follows
Xi
4
={x = (xi)i∈I¯\J22Fk+`−w2 : |xJ1 | = p− 2i, |xJ21 | = i}
A codeword of weight p in U” corresponds to some word in one of the Xi’s by puncturing it in
J22. We obviously have the lower bound
P {∃x ∈ U ′ : |xI¯ | = p | W = w} ≥
bp/2c
max
i=0
{P(Xi ∩ U ′′′ 6= ∅)} (19)
By using Lemma 4 we have
P(Xi ∩ U ′′′ 6= ∅) ≥ f
( (
k+`−2w
p−2i
)(
w
i
)
2max(0,k+`−w−kU )
)
. (20)
On the other hand, we may notice that P(W = w) = P(w2(e) = w) when e is drawn uniformly at
random among the binary words of weight k+ ` and length n. By using Proposition 10 we deduce
P(W = w) =
(
n/2
w
)(
n/2−w
k+`−2w
)
2k+`−2w(
n
k+`
) .
These considerations lead to the following lower bound on Psucc
Psucc ≥
n/2∑
w=0
(
n/2
w
)(
n/2−w
k+`−2w
)
2k+`−2w(
n
k+`
) bp/2cmax
i=0
f
( (
k+`−2w
p−2i
)(
w
i
)
2max(0,k+`−w−kU )
)
(21)
uunionsq
Complexity of recovering a permuted version of U . As for recovering the permuted V
code, the complexity for recovering the permuted U is of order Ω
(
C1(p,`)
Psucc
)
.
7.5 Distinguishing a (U,U + V ) code
It is not clear in the first case that from the single knowledge of V ′ and a permuted version of V
we are able to find a permutation of the positions which gives to the whole code the structure of
a (U,U + V )-code. However in both cases as single successful call to ComputeV (resp. ComputeU)
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is really distinguishing the code from a random code of the same length and dimension. In other
words, we have a distinguishing attack whose complexity is given by min(O(CU ), O(CV )) where
CU
4
=
C1(p, `)∑n/2
w=0
(n/2w )(
n/2−w
k+`−2w)2k+`−2w
( nk+`)
max
bp/2c
i=0 f
(
(k+`−2wp−2i )(
w
i )
2max(0,k+`−w−kU )
)
CV
4
=
C1(p, `)∑n/2
w=0
(n/2w )(
n/2
n−k−`−w)
( nn−k−`)
f
((
n/2−w
p
)
2kV +w−n/2
)
and f(x)
4
= max (x(1− x/2), 1− 1/x). As for the decoders of §6 the above numbers are minimized
(independently) over p and `.
We end this section by remarking that the dual of a code (U,U +V ) is (U⊥+V ⊥, V ⊥) thus we
have the same attack with the dual. With k/n = 0.5, these two attacks have the same complexity
as CU = CV ⊥ and CV = CU⊥ .
8 Parameter Selection
In the light of the security proof in §4 and the rejection sampling method in §5, we need to derive
parameters which lead to negligible success for the two following problems:
1. Solve a syndrome decoding problem with qhash instances (DOOM) for parameters n, k, w.
2. Distinguish public matrices of the code family (U,U + V ) from random matrices of same size.
In the security proof we required a salt size λ0 = λ + 2 log2(qsign) where qsign is the number
of signature queries allowed to the adversary. Since qsign ≤ 2λ (λ the security parameter) we
choose a conservative λ0 = 3λ. We gave in §6 and §7 state-of-the-art algorithms for the two
problems mentioned above. This served as a basis for the parameters proposed in Table 2. For
the key security, the estimates CU and CV are derived from the formulas at the end of §7. In
those formulas the C1(p, `) term derives from Dumer’s algorithm. Using more involved techniques
[MMT11, BJMM12, MO15] will reduce the key security but will leave it above the security claims.
For the message security (log2 WF), it is based on the DOOM variant of Dumer’s algorithm, which
is the current state-of-the-art. Algorithmic improvements, like adapting DOOM to BJMM, may
lower the message security and require an adjustment of the sizes.
λ (security) 80 128 256
n 4800 7700 15400
k = kU + kV 2400 3850 7700
kV 916 1470 2940
w 916 1470 2940
Signature length (bits) 4940 8084 16168
Public key size (MBytes) 0.720 1.853 7.411
Secret key size (MBytes) 0.347 0.887 3.525
log2(qhash
√
ε) (Prop. 5 §4.2) −208 −334 −668
log2 CV (§7) 171 275 550
log2 CU (§7) 250 401 803
log2 WF (§6) 80 128 256
Table 2. Proposed Parameters for the (U,U + V ) Signature Scheme
Key Sizes. The public key is a parity-check matrix, given in systematic form Hpub = (I | R)
which requires k(n − k) bits. The secret key consists of a non-singular matrix S, a secret parity-
check matrix Hsec and a permutation matrix P where
Hpub = SHsecP with Hsec =
(
HU 0
HV HV
)
,
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and HU and HV are parity-check matrices of U and V . Here, we not not need to include S in the
secret key, it is used in the signature to compute S−1sT which can be derived from Hsec and P
when the public key is systematic. We have
S−1sT = S−1(I | R)
(
sT
0
)
= S−1Hpub
(
sT
0
)
= HsecP
(
sT
0
)
.
The secret thus consists of P, that is stored with log(n!) ≤ n ln(n) bits, and HU ,HV in systematic
form, that is stored with kU (n/2− kU ) + kV (n/2− kV ) bits.
Implementation. In Table 2 the ratio w/n is chosen close to 0.191 to minimize the rejection
probability (see §5). For the three security levels we need to perform on average 27, 37, or 75
Gaussian eliminations to produce a signature. Most of those Gaussian elimination are performed
on parity-check matrices of shortened codes. Finally, let us mention that the signature length
(n+ 3λ in the table) can be reduced (by about 30%) by choosing a compact representation of the
sparse error vector.
9 Concluding remarks
We have presented the first code-based signature scheme whose security parameter scales polyno-
mially in key size. By code-based scheme, we mean here the restricted case of the Hamming metric
for expressing the decoding problem. This setting presents the advantage that we are in the case
where the decoding problem has been thoroughly studied for many decades and where it can be
considered that the complexity of the best known attacks has not dramatically changed since the
early sixties.
Comparison with TESLA-2. Contrarily to the overwhelming majority of lattice-based or code-
based proposals during the last decade, we avoided here the use of structured codes based on a
ring structure (such as quasi-cyclic codes). The entropy of our public key is a constant fraction
of the entropy of a random matrix of the same size. Note that the entropy loss in our case
is much lower than the one observed for the aforementioned structured cases. This is the first
code-based signature scheme where such a low entropy loss in the public key has been obtained.
With a parameter selection matching tightly with the security reduction, the public key size stays
reasonable: less than 2 megabytes (MB) for 128 bits of classical security and less than 6 MB with
the QROM reduction of [CD17] for 128 bits of quantum security. This is strongly related to the
tightness of our security reduction. There are no other (Hamming metric) code-based to compare
with our scheme. The closest scheme we can compare with is TESLA-2 [ABB+17] which is an
unstructured lattice based scheme that has a quantum security reduction in the QROM too. The
public key sizes are much bigger in their case: almost 22 MB for the same level of quantum security
or more than 11 MB for the same level of classical security.
Problem P2: the (U,U + V )-code distinguishing problem. The second problem on which
our security relies is indeed very clean and simple. It consists in deciding whether there exists for
a given linear code, a permutation of its positions that makes it a (U,U +V ) code. This simplicity
makes the problem really appealing in a cryptographic context. It departs from the actual trend
in code-based or lattice-based cryptography which relies solely on the difficulty of decoding or
deciding whether or not a code/lattice contains codewords/lattice elements of low weight/norm.
Despite its simplicity, there are strong reasons such as its NP-completeness (see Theorem 3) to
believe in the hardness of this problem. Even weak versions of this problem are NP-complete.
For instance, even the restricted problem of deciding whether there exists a permutation of the
second half of the code positions which makes the code to be a (U,U + V )-code is NP-complete
(see Theorem 4). The fact that (U,U + V ) codes seem to depart from random codes solely by
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their lowest/highest weight codewords and the fact that the best algorithms to date for solving
this problem use low weight codeword finding algorithms might indicate that there might be a
tight connection of this problem to the problem of finding low weight codewords in a code. This
is a tantalizing connection which is worth investigating.
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A Proofs for §4
A.1 List Emulation
In the security proof, we need to build lists of indices (salts) in Fλ02 . Those lists have size qsign, the
maximum number of signature queries allowed to the adversary, a number which is possibly very
large. For each message m which is either hashed or signed in the game we need to be able to
– create a list Lm of qsign random elements of Fλ02 , when calling the constructor new list();
– pick an element in Lm, using the method Lm.next(), this element can be picked only once;
– decide whether or not a given salt r is in Lm, when calling Lm.contains(r).
The straightforward manner to achieve this is to draw qsign random numbers when the list is
constructed, this has to be done once for each different message m used in the game. This may
result in a quadratic cost qhashqsign just to build the lists. Once the lists are constructed, and
assuming they are stored in a proper data structure (a heap for instance) picking an element or
testing membership has a cost at most O(log qsign), that is at most linear in the security parameter
λ.
class list method list.contains(r)
elt, index return r ∈ {elt[i], 1 ≤ i ≤ qsign}
list()
index← 0 method list.next()
for i = 1, . . . , qsign index← index + 1
elt[i]← randint(2λ0) return elt[index]
Fig. 6. Standard implementation of the list operations.
Note that in our game we condition on the event that all elements of Lm are different. This
implies that now Lm is obtained by choosing among the subsets of size qsign of Fλ02 uniformly at
random. We wish to emulate the list operations and never construct them explicitly such that
the probabilistic model for Lm.next() and Lm.contains(r) stays the same as above (but again
conditioned on the event that all elements of Lm are different). For this purpose, we want to ensure
that at any time we call either Lm.contains(r) or Lm.next() we have
P(Lm.contains(r) = true) = P(r ∈ Lm|Q) (22)
P(r = Lm.next()) = p(r|Q) (23)
for every r ∈ Fλ02 . Here Q represents the queries to r made so far and whether or not these r’s
belong to Lm. Queries to r can be made through two different calls. The first one is a call of
the form Sign(m) when it chooses r during the random assignment r ←↩ {0, 1}λ0 . This results
in a call to Hash(m, r) which queries itself whether r belongs to Lm or not through the call
Lm.contains(r). The answer is necessarily positive in this case. The second way to query r is
by calling Hash(m, r) directly. In this case, both answers true and false are possible. p(r|Q)
represents the probability distribution of Lm.next() that we have in the above implementation of
the list operations given the previous queries Q.
A convenient way to represent Q is through three lists S, Htrue and Hfalse. S is the list of r’s
that have been queried through a call Sign(m). They belong necessarily to Lm. Htrue is the set
of r’s that have not been queried so far through a call to Sign(m) but have been queried through
a direct call Hash(m, r) and for which Lm.contains(r) returned true. Hfalse is the list of r’s that
have been queried by a call of the form Hash(m, r) and Lm.contains(r) returned false.
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We clearly have
P(r ∈ Lm|Q) = 0 if r ∈ Hfalse (24)
P(r ∈ Lm|Q) = 1 if r ∈ S ∪Htrue (25)
P(r ∈ Lm|Q) = qsign − |Htrue| − |S|
2λ0 − |Htrue| − |S| − |Hfalse| else. (26)
To compute the probability distribution p(r|Q) it is helpful to notice that
P(Lm.next() outputs an element of Htrue ) =
|Htrue|
qsign − |S| . (27)
This can be used to derive p(r|Q) as follows
p(r|Q) = 0 if r ∈ Hfalse ∪ S (28)
p(r|Q) = 1
qsign − S if r ∈ Htrue (29)
p(r|Q) = qsign − |S| − |Htrue|
(qsign − S)(2λ0 − |Htrue| − |S| − |Hfalse|) else. (30)
(28) is obvious. (29) follows from that all elements of Htrue have the same probability to be
chosen as return value for Lm.next() and (27). (30) follows by a similar reasoning by arguing
(i) that all the elements of Fλ02 \ (S ∪Htrue ∪Hfalse) have the same probability to be chosen
as return value for Lm.next(), (ii) the probability that Lm.next() outputs an element of Fλ02 \
(S ∪Htrue ∪Hfalse) is the probability that it does not output an element of Htrue which is 1 −
|Htrue|
qsign−|S| =
qsign−|S|−|Htrue|
qsign−|S| .
Figure 7 explains how we perform the emulation of the list operations so that they perform
similarly to genuine list operations as specified above. The idea is to create and to operate explicitly
on the lists S, Htrue and Hfalse described earlier. We have chosen there
β =
qsign − |Htrue| − |S|
2λ0 − |Htrue| − |S| − |Hfalse| and γ =
|Htrue|
qsign − |S| .
we also assume that when we call randomPop() on a list it outputs an element of the list uniformly
at random and removes this element from it. The method push adds an element in a list. The
procedure rand() picks a real number between 0 and 1 uniformly at random.
class list method list.contains(r) method list.next()
Htrue, Hfalse, S if r 6∈ Htrue ∪Hfalse ∪ S if rand() ≤ γ
list() if rand() ≤ β r← Htrue.randomPop()
Htrue ← ∅ Htrue.push(r) else
Hfalse ← ∅ else r←↩ Fλ02 \ (Htrue ∪ S ∪Hfalse)
S ← ∅ Hfalse.push(r) S.push(r)
return r ∈ Htrue ∪ S return r
Fig. 7. Emulation of the list operations.
The correctness of this emulation follows directly from the calculations given above. For in-
stance the correctness of the call Lm.next() follows from the fact that with probability
|Htrue|
qsign−|S| = γ
it outputs an element of Htrue chosen uniformly at random (see (27)). In such a case the corre-
sponding element has to be moved from Htrue to S (since it has been queried now through a
call to Sign(m)). The correctness of Lm.contains(r) is a direct consequence of the formulas
for P(r ∈ Lm|Q) given in (24), (25) and (26). All push, pop, membership testing above can be
implemented in time proportional to λ0.
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A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
The goal of this subsection is to estimate the probability of a collision in a signature query for a
message m when we allow at most qsign queries (the event F in the security proof) and to deduce
Lemma 1 of §4.3. We recall that in Scode for each signature query, we pick r uniformly at random
in {0, 1}λ0 . Then the probability we are looking for is bounded by the probability to pick the same
r at least twice after qsign draws. The following lemma will be useful.
Lemma 5. The probability to have at least one collision after drawing uniformly and indepen-
dently t elements in a set of size n is upper bounded by t2/n for sufficiently large n and t2 < n.
Proof. The probability of no collisions after drawing independently t elements among n is:
pn,t
4
=
t−1∏
i=0
(
1− i
n
)
≥ 1−
t−1∑
i=0
i
n
= 1− t(t− 1)
2n
from which we easily get 1− pn,t ≤ t2/n, concluding the proof.
In our case, the probability of the event F is bounded by the previous probability for t = qsign
and n = 2λ0 , so, with λ0 = λ+ 2 log2 qsign, we can conclude that
P (F ) ≤ q
2
sign
2λ0
=
1
2λ0−2 log2(qsign)
=
1
2λ
which concludes the proof of Lemma 1.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 5 and Lemma 2
Our goal in this subsection is to prove Lemma 2 of §4.3 and to achieve this we will first prove Propo-
sition 5 of §4.2 which asserts that syndromes by Hpub of errors of weight w are indistinguishable
from random elements in Fn−k2 :
Proposition 5. Let DHw be the distribution of the syndromes HeT when e is drawn uniformly at
random among the binary vectors of weight w and U be the uniform distribution over the syndrome
space Fn−k2 . We have
EHpub
(
ρ(DHpubw ,U)
)
≤ 1
2
√
ε
with
ε =
2n−k(
n
w
) + 2n/2−kU (n/2w/2)(n
w
) + ∑
j∈{0,...,w}
j≡w (mod 2)
22j+n/2−kV
(
n/2
(w−j)/2
)2(n/2−(w−j)/2
j
)
(
n/2
j
)(
n
w
)2
2
.
Proposition 5 is based on two lemmas. The first one is a general lemma given in §4.3.
Lemma 3. Consider a finite family H = (hi)i∈I of functions from a finite set E to a finite set
F . Denote by ε the bias of the collision probability, i.e. the quantity such that
Ph,e,e′(h(e) = h(e′)) =
1
|F | (1 + ε)
where h is drawn uniformly at random in H, e and e′ are drawn uniformly at random in E. Let
U be the uniform distribution over F and D(h) be the distribution of the outputs h(e) when e is
chosen uniformly at random in E. We have
Eh {ρ(D(h),U)} ≤ 1
2
√
ε.
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Proof. Let qh,f be the probability distribution of the discrete random variable (h0, h0(e)) where h0
is drawn uniformly at random in H and e drawn uniformly at random in E (i.e. qh,f = Ph0,e(h0 =
h, h0(e) = f)). By definition of the statistical distance we have
Eh {ρ(D(h),U)} =
∑
h∈H
1
|H|ρ(D(h),U)
=
∑
h∈H
1
2|H|
∑
f∈F
∣∣∣∣Pe(h(e) = f)− 1|F |
∣∣∣∣
=
1
2
∑
(h,f)∈H×F
∣∣∣∣Ph0,e(h0 = h, h0(e) = f)− 1|H| · |F |
∣∣∣∣
=
1
2
∑
(h,f)∈H×F
∣∣∣∣qh,f − 1|H| · |F |
∣∣∣∣ . (31)
Using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we obtain
∑
(h,f)∈H×F
∣∣∣∣qh,f − 1|H| · |F |
∣∣∣∣ ≤
√√√√ ∑
(h,f)∈H×F
(
qh,f − 1|H| · |F |
)2
·
√
|H| · |F |. (32)
Let us observe now that
∑
(h,f)∈H×F
(
qh,f − 1|H| · |F |
)2
=
∑
h,f
(
q2h,f − 2
qh,f
|H| · |F | +
1
|H|2 · |F |2
)
=
∑
h,f
q2h,f − 2
∑
h,f qh,f
|H| · |F | +
1
|H| · |F |
=
∑
h,f
q2h,f −
1
|H| · |F | . (33)
Consider for i ∈ {0, 1} independent random variables hi and ei that are drawn uniformly at
random in H and E respectively. We continue this computation by noticing now that∑
h,f
q2h,f =
∑
h,f
Ph0,e0(h0 = h, h0(e0) = f)Ph1,e1(h1 = h, h1(e1) = f)
= Ph0,h1,e0,e1 (h0 = h1, h0(e0) = h1(e1))
=
Ph0,e0,e1 (h0(e0) = h0(e1))
|H|
=
1 + ε
|H| · |F | . (34)
By substituting for
∑
h,f q
2
h,f the expression obtained in (34) into (33) and then back into (32) we
finally obtain
∑
(h,f)∈H×F
∣∣∣∣qh,f − 1|H| · |F |
∣∣∣∣ ≤
√
1 + ε
|H| · |F | −
1
|H| · |F |
√
|H| · |F | =
√
ε
|H| · |F |
√
|H| · |F | = √ε.
This finishes the proof of our lemma. uunionsq
In order to use this lemma to bound the statistical distance we are interested in, we perform now
the following computation
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Lemma 6. Assume that x and y are random vectors of Sw that are drawn uniformly at random
in this set. We have
PHpub,x,y
(
Hpubx
T = Hpuby
T
) ≤ 1
2n−k
(1 + ε) with ε given in Proposition 5.
Proof. Recall that Hpub is obtained as
Hpub = SHsecP with Hsec
4
=
(
HU 0
HV HV
)
where HU has been chosen uniformly at random in F(n/2−kU )×n/22 , HV has been chosen uni-
formly in F(n/2−kV )×n/22 , S has been chosen uniformly at random among the invertible matrices
in F(n−k)×(n−k)2 and P among the n × n permutation matrices. As S is non-singular and P is a
permutation, the probability of the event Hpubx
T = Hpuby
T is the same as the probability of the
event (
HU 0
HV HV
)
xT =
(
HU 0
HV HV
)
yT .
Let x be a vector of Fn2 , we will denote in the following by x1 (resp. x2) the vector formed by its
first (resp. last) n/2 coordinates. In other words, the probability we are looking for is
PHU ,HV ,x,y
(
HU (x1 + y1)
T = 0 ∧HV (x1 + x2 + y1 + y2)T = 0
)
.
To compute this probability we use Lemma 7 which says that:
PH
(
HeT = 0
)
=
1
2n−k
if e 6= 0 and 1 otherwise (35)
when H is chosen uniformly at random in F(n−k)×n2 . This lemma motivates to distinguish between
four disjoint events
Event 1:
E1 4={x1 + y1 = 0 ∧ x1 + x2 + y1 + y2 6= 0}
Event 2:
E2 4={x1 + y1 6= 0 ∧ x1 + x2 + y1 + y2 = 0}
Event 3:
E3 4={x1 + y1 6= 0 ∧ x1 + x2 + y1 + y2 6= 0}
Event 4:
E4 4={x1 + y1 = 0 ∧ x1 + x2 + y1 + y2 = 0}
Under these events we get thanks to (35):
PHsec,x,y
(
Hsecx
T = Hsecy
T
)
=
4∑
i=1
PHsec
(
Hsecx
T = Hsecy
T |Ei
)
Px,y (Ei)
=
Px,y (E1)
2n/2−kV
+
Px,y (E2)
2n/2−kU
+
Px,y (E3)
2n−k
+ Px,y (E4)
=
1
2n−k
(
P (E1)
2n/2−kV −n+k
+
P (E2)
2n/2−kU−n+k
+ P (E3) + 2n−kP (E4)
)
≤ 1
2n−k
(
1 + 2n/2−kUP (E1) + 2n/2−kV P (E2) + 2n−kP(E4)
)
, (36)
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where we used for the last inequality the trivial upper-bound P (E3) ≤ 1. Let us now upper-bound
(or compute) the probabilities of the events E1, E2 and E4. For E4 we clearly have
Px,y (E4) = P(x = y) = 1(n
w
) .
For E1 we derive the following upper-bound
Px,y (E1) ≤ P (x1 = y1)
=
w∑
w1=0
(
n/2
w1
)(
n/2
w−w1
)2(
n
w
)2
≤
w∑
w1=0
(
n/2
w1
)(
n/2
w−w1
)(
n
w
)2 (n/2w/2
)
(37)
=
(
n/2
w/2
)(
n
w
) (38)
where (37) follows from
(
n/2
w−w1
)2 ≤ ( n/2w−w1)(n/2w/2) for all w1 in {0, . . . , w} and (38) from∑w
w1=0
(
n/2
w1
)(
n/2
w−w1
)
=
(
n
w
)
. To upper-bound P (E2), let us first derive the distribution of x1 + x2.
We first observe that
P(x1 + x2 = e) = P
(
x1 + x2 = e
∣∣∣ |x1 + x2| = we)P(|x1 + x2| = we)
=
1(
n/2
we
)2we ( n/2(w−we)/2)(n/2−(w−we)/2we )(n
w
) (by Prop. 10) (39)
if we ≡ w (mod 2), where we is the Hamming weight of e. If we does not have the same parity as
w, then this probability is equal to 0. From this we deduce that
Px,y (E2) ≤ P (x1 + x2 = y1 + y2)
=
∑
j∈{0,...,w}
j≡w (mod 2)
∑
e∈Fn/22 :|e|=j
Px (x1 + x2 = e)2
=
∑
j∈{0,...,w}
j≡w (mod 2)
1(
n/2
j
)22j ( n/2(w−j)/2)2(n/2−(w−j)/2j )2(
n
w
)2 (by Eq. (39))
By plugging these upper-bounds in (36), we finally obtain:
PHpub,x,y
(
Hpubx
T = Hpuby
T
)
≤ 1
2n−k
1 + 2n−k(n
w
) + 2n/2−kU (n/2w/2)(n
w
) + w∑
j∈{0,...,w}
j≡w (mod 2)
22j+n/2−kV
(
n/2
(w−j)/2
)2(n/2−(w−j)/2
j
)
(
n/2
j
)(
n
w
)2
2

which concludes the proof. uunionsq
These two lemmas imply directly Proposition 5.
Proof (Proposition 5). Indeed we let in Lemma 3, E
4
=Fn2 , F
4
=Fn−k2 and H be the set of functions
associated to the 4-tuples (HU ,HV ,S,P) used to generate a public parity-check matrix Hpub
through (9). These functions h are given by h(e) = Hpube
T . Lemma 6 gives an upper-bound for
the ε term in Lemma 3 and this finishes the proof of Proposition 5. uunionsq
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We are now able to prove Lemma 2 (we use here notations of the security proof in §4.3).
Lemma 2.
P(S1) ≤ P(S2) + qhash
2
√
ε where ε is given in Proposition 5.
Proof (Lemma 2). To simplify notation we let q
4
= qhash. Then we notice that
P(S1) ≤ P(S2) + ρ(Dpubw,q ,Dpub ⊗ U⊗q), (40)
where
– U is the uniform distribution over Fn−k2 ;
– Dpubw,q is the distribution of the (q + 1)-tuples (Hpub,HpubeT1 , · · · ,HpubeTq ) where the ei’s are
independent and uniformly distributed in Sw;
– Dpub ⊗ U⊗q is the distribution of the (q + 1)-tuples (Hpub, sT1 , · · · , sTq ) where the si’s are
independent and uniformly distributed in Fn−k2 .
We now observe that
ρ(Dpubw,q ,Dpub ⊗ U⊗q) =
∑
H∈F(n−k)×n2
P(Hpub = H)ρ((DHw )⊗q,U⊗q)
≤ q
∑
H∈F(n−k)×n2
P(Hpub = H)ρ(DHw ,U) (by Prop. 4)
= qEHpub
{
ρ(Dpubw ,U)
}
≤ q
√
ε
2
(by Prop. 5).
uunionsq
B Proofs for §5
B.1 Proof of Proposition 11 and Theorem 2
First of all it is straightforward to check that the distributions pui are given by
Proposition 10 (Distribution of w1 and w2). For all i in {0, . . . , w} such that w ≡ i (mod 2)
pu2
(
w − i
2
)
= pu1 (i) = 2
i
(
n/2
(w−i)/2
)(
n/2−(w−i)/2
i
)(
n
w
)
and for other choices of i, p1(i) and p2(i) are equal to 0.
On the other hand the distributions psddi of the source distortion decoder are given by
Proposition 11. Let θ denote the internal coin used in the probabilistic algorithm D and
p(i)
4
=Ps,θ(|D(H, s)| = i)
If two executions of D are independent, then for all i in {0, . . . , w} such that w − i ≡ 0 (mod 2)
we have
psdd2
(
w − i
2
)
= psdd1 (i) =
xi p(i)
p1w
(41)
where
p1w
4
=
∑
0≤j≤w
j≡w (mod 2)
xj p(j)
and psdd1 (i) = 0 for other choices of i.
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Proof. Let e be the output of Algorithm 2. Recall that
psdd1 (j)
4
=Pe (w1(e) = j) = Ps,θ(|D(HV , s)| = j).
As two executions of D are independent, by a disjunction of independent events the probability
to get an error e such that w1(e) = i is given by:
+∞∑
l=0
αlβi =
βi
1− α (42)
where α denotes the probability that the output of D at Instruction 2 of Algorithm 2 is rejected
and βi the probability to have an error of weight i which is accepted. These probabilities are
readily seen to be equal to:
βi = p(i)xi ; α = 1−
∑
0≤j≤w
j≡w (mod 2)
xjp(j).
Plugging this expression in (42) finishes the proof. uunionsq
Let us recall that Dw is the distribution {DHsec,w(s) : s←↩ Fn−k2 } where DHsec,w is Algorithm
2. Recall now Theorem 2
Theorem 2. If the source decoder D used in Algorithm 2 behaves uniformly for HV and uniformly
for H′′U which is obtained from (HU , eV ) in Proposition 2 (see §3.2) for all error patterns eV
obtained as eV = D(HV , s2), we have:
ρ (Dw,Uw) = ρ
(
psdd1 , p
u
1
)
where Dw is the output distribution of Algorithm 2. Then, output of Algorithm 2 is the uniform
distribution over Sw if in addition two executions of D are independent and the no-rejection
probability vector x is chosen for any i in {0, . . . , w} as
xi =
1
Mrs
pu1 (i)
p(i)
if w ≡ i (mod 2) xi = 0 otherwise
with p(i)
4
=Ps,θ(|D(HV , s)| = i) and Mrs 4= sup
0≤i≤w
i≡w (mod 2)
pu1 (i)
p(i) .
Proof. Let us first introduce some notation. Let e be a random variable whose distribution is Uw,
i.e. the uniform distribution over Sw, and let e˜ be a random variable whose distribution is Dw.
The last random variable can be viewed in a natural way as the output of Algorithm 2 and is of
the form e˜ = (eU , eU + eV ). We view eU and eV as random variables. We have
ρ (Dw,Uw) =
∑
e1,e2∈Fn/22 :|(e1,e2)|=w
|P(e˜ = (e1, e2))− P(e = (e1, e2))| . (43)
We notice now that
P(e˜ = (e1, e2)) = P(eU = e1|eV = e1 + e2)P(eV = e1 + e2)
= P(eU = e1|eV = e1 + e2)Ps2,θ(D(HV , s2) = e1 + e2). (44)
From the assumption on the uniform behavior of D we deduce that Ps2,θ(D(HV , s2) = e1 + e2)
only depends on the Hamming weight |e1 + e2| of e1 + e2. We recall now that in Algorithm 2 we
have
eU = D(HU , s1, eV )
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Let
n′
4
=n/2− |eV | ; w′ 4= w − |eV |
2
and H′′U , s
′′
1 are elements given by (HU , s1, eV ) in Proposition 2 in §3.2. It will now be convenient to
split eU and e1 into two parts: the first one, denoted respectively by e
′
U , and e
′
1 is the restriction of
these vectors to the complement of the support of eV , whereas the second one, denoted respectively
by e′′U and e
′′
1 is the restriction of these vectors to the support of eV . With this notation, we now
notice that
P(eU = e1|eV = e1 + e2) = P(s1,s2),θ(e′U = e′1, e′′U = e′′1 |eV = e1 + e2)
= Ps1,θ(e′U = e′1)Ps1,θ(e′′U = e′′1)
= Ps1,θ(Dw′(H′′U , s′′1) = e′1)Ps1,θ(e′′U = e′′1)
=
1(
n′
w′
) 1
2n/2−n′
. (45)
The last equality follows from the fact that D behaves uniformly on H′′U for all patterns eV and
therefore the output of Dw′(H
′′
U , s
′′
1) is the uniform distribution over the set of words of weight
w′ in Fn′2 . Equality (45) implies that P(eU = e1|eV = e1 + e2) only depends on the weight of
w′ which itself only depends on the weight of e1 + e2. Since Ps2,θ(D(HV , s2) = e1 + e2) has the
same property, we deduce from (44), that P(e˜ = (e1, e2)) only depends on the weight of e1 + e2.
Obviously P(e = (e1, e2)) also has this property. We may therefore write
P(e˜ = (e1, e2)) = f(|e1 + e2)|)
P(e = (e1, e2)) = g(|e1 + e2)|)
for some functions f and g. Plugging these expressions in (43) yields by bringing in the quantity
mi which is the number of e in Sw such that w1(e) = i:
ρ (Dw,Uw) =
∑
0≤i≤w
i≡w (mod 2)
∑
m∈Sw|w1(m)=i
|P(e˜ = m)− P(e = m)|
=
∑
0≤i≤w
i≡w (mod 2)
mi |f(i)− g(i)|
=
∑
0≤i≤w
i≡w (mod 2)
|mi(f(i)− g(i))|
=
∑
0≤i≤w
i≡w (mod 2)
|P(w1(e˜) = i)− P(w1(e) = i)|
= ρ(psdd1 , p
u
1 ).
The last part of the proposition follows from the fact that the psdd1 (i)’s are functions of the non-
rejection probability vector x = (xi). Thanks to what we just proved, we can compute the xi’s to
have ρ(psdd1 , p
u
1 ) = 0. This will imply that the output of Algorithm 2 is the uniform distribution.
Indeed, we first notice that for all i:
0 ≤ xi = 1
Mrs
pu1 (i)
p(i)
=
 inf
0≤j≤w
w≡j (mod 2)
p(j)
pu1 (j)
 pu1 (i)
p(i)
≤ p(i)
p1u(i)
pu1 (i)
p(i)
= 1
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which allows to assert that x is a probability vector. We now use the following equations for all i:
psdd1 (i) =
xi p(i)
p1w
=
pu1 (i)
Mrs
∑
0≤j≤w
w≡j (mod 2)
1
Mrs
pu1 (j)
= pu1 (i)
where the last line relies on the equality
∑
0≤j≤w
w≡j (mod 2)
pu1 (j) = 1. uunionsq
B.2 Proof of Proposition 6 and discussion related to it
Here the internal coins are over the choices of the n− k positions I (columns of the parity-check
matrix H) we choose to invert in the Prange algorithm. We have here
p(w) =
∑
e:|e|=w
Ps,I
(
e = DPrange(H, s)
)
=
∑
I⊂{1,...,n}:|I|=n−k
P(I)
∑
e:|e|=w
Ps(e = DPrange(H, s)|I)
=
∑
I⊂{1,...,n}:|I|=n−k
P(I)
∑
e:|e|=w,Supp(e)⊂I
1
2n−k
=
(
n−k
w
)
2n−k
.
This ends the proof of Proposition 6. uunionsq
C Proofs of results of §7
C.1 Proof of Proposition 7 in §7
Let us recall Proposition 7
Proposition 7. Assume that we choose a (U,U+V ) code by picking the parity-check matrices of U
and V uniformly at random among the binary matrices of size (n/2−kU )×n/2 and (n/2−kV )×n/2
respectively. Let a(U,U+V )(w), a(U,U)(w) and a(0,V )(w) be the expected number of codewords of
weight w that are respectively in the (U,U + V ) code, of the form (u,u) where u belongs to U and
of the form (0,v) where v belongs to V . These numbers are given for even w in {0, . . . , n} by
a(U,U+V )(w) =
(
n/2
w/2
)
2n/2−kU
+
(
n/2
w
)
2n/2−kV
+
1
2n−kU−kV
((
n
w
)
−
(
n/2
w
)
−
(
n/2
w/2
))
a(U,U)(w) =
(
n/2
w/2
)
2n/2−kU
; a(0,V )(w) =
(
n/2
w
)
2n/2−kV
and for odd w in {0, . . . , n} by
a(U,U+V )(w) =
(
n/2
w
)
2n/2−kV
+
1
2n−kU−kV
((
n
w
)
−
(
n/2
w
))
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a(U,U)(w) = 0 ; a(0,V )(w) =
(
n/2
w
)
2n/2−kV
On the other hand, when we choose a code of length n with a random parity-check matrix of size
(n − kU − kV ) × n chosen uniformly at random, then the expected number a(w) of codewords of
weight w > 0 is given by
a(w) =
(
n
w
)
2n−kU−kV
.
We will need the following lemma.
Lemma 7. Let y be a non-zero vector of Fn2 and s an arbitrary element in Fr2. We choose a matrix
H of size r × n uniformly at random among the set of r × n binary matrices. In this case
P
(
HyT = sT
)
=
1
2r
Proof. The coefficient of H at row i and column j is denoted by hij , whereas the coefficients of y
and s are denoted by yi and si respectively. The probability we are looking for is the probability
to have ∑
j
hijyj = si (46)
for all i in {1, . . . , r}. Since y is non zero, it has at least one non-zero coordinate. Without loss
of generality, we may assume that y1 = 1. We may rewrite (46) as hi1 =
∑
j>1 hijyj . This event
happens with probability 12 for a given i and with probability
1
2r on all r events simultaneously
due to the independence of the hij ’s.
The last part of Proposition 7 is a direct application of this lemma. We namely have
Proposition 12. Let a(w) be the expected number of codewords of weight w in a binary linear
code C of length n whose parity-check matrix is chosen H uniformly at random among all binary
matrices of size r × n. We have
a(w) =
(
n
w
)
2r
.
Proof. Let Z
4
=
∑
x∈Fn2 :|x|=w Zx where Zx is the indicator function of the event “x is in C”. We
have
a(w) = E(Z)
=
∑
x∈Fn2 :|x|=w
E(Zx)
=
∑
x∈Fn2 :|x|=w
P(x ∈ C)
=
∑
x∈Fn2 :|x|=w
P(HxT = 0)
=
∑
x∈Fn2 :|x|=w
1
2r
=
(
n
w
)
2r
.
This proves the part of Proposition 7 dealing with the expected weight distribution of a random
linear code. We are ready now to prove Proposition 7 concerning the expected weight distribution
of a random (U,U + V ) code.
Weight distributions of (U,U)
4
={(u,u) : u ∈ U} and (0, V )4={(0,v) : v ∈ V }. This follows
directly from Proposition 12 since a(U,U)(w) = 0 for odd and a(U,U)(w) is equal to the expected
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number of codewords of weight w/2 in a random linear code of length n/2 with a parity-check
matrix of size (n/2− kU )×n/2 when w is even. On the other hand a(0,V ) is equal to the expected
number of weight w in a random linear code of length n/2 and with a parity-check matrix of size
(n/2− kV )× n/2. In other words
a(U,U)(w) = 0 if w is odd
a(U,U)(w) =
(
n/2
w/2
)
2n/2−kU
if w is even
a(0,V )(w) =
(
n/2
w
)
2n/2−kV
Weight distributions of (U,U + V ). The code (U,U + V ) is chosen randomly by picking up
a parity-check matrix HU of U uniformly at random among the set of (n/2 − kU ) × n/2 binary
matrices and a parity-check matrix HV of V uniformly at random among the set of (n/2−kV )×n/2
binary matrices. Let Z
4
=
∑
x∈Fn2 :|x|=w Zx where Zx is the indicator function of the event “x is in
(U,U + V )”.
We have
a(U,U+V )(w) = E(Z)
=
∑
x∈Fn2 :|x|=w
E(Zx)
=
∑
x∈Fn2 :|x|=w
P(Zx = 1)
=
∑
x∈Fn2 :|x|=w
P(x ∈ (U,U + V )) (47)
By writing x = (x1,x2) where xi is in Fn/22 we know that x is in (U,U + V ) if and only if at the
same time x1 is in U and x2 + x1 is in V , that is
HUx
T
1 = 0, HV x
T
1 = HV x
T
2 .
There are three cases to consider
Case 1: x1 = 0 and x2 6= 0. In this case
P(x ∈ (U,U + V )) = P(HV xT2 = 0) =
1
2n/2−kV
(48)
Case 2: x1 = x2. In this case
P(x ∈ (U,U + V )) = P(HUxT1 = 0) =
1
2n/2−kU
(49)
Case 3: x1 6= x2 and x1 6= 0. In this case
P(x ∈ (U,U + V )) = P(HUxT1 = 0 ∧HV (xT1 + xT2 ) = 0) =
1
2n/2−kU
1
2n/2−kV
(50)
Note that we used in each case Lemma 7.
By substituting P(x ∈ (U,U + V )) in (47) we obtain for even 0 < w ≤ n
a(U,U+V )(w) =
(
n/2
w/2
)
2n/2−kU
+
(
n/2
w
)
2n/2−kV
+
1
2n−kU−kV
((
n
w
)
−
(
n/2
w
)
−
(
n/2
w/2
))
and for odd w ≤ n
a(w) =
(
n/2
w
)
2n/2−kV
+
1
2n−kU−kV
((
n
w
)
−
(
n/2
w
))
which concludes the proof. uunionsq
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C.2 Proof of Theorem 3
Recall first our problem.
Problem 3. ( (U,U + V )-distinguishing)
Instance: A binary linear code C and an integer kU ,
Question: Is there a permutation pi of length n such that pi(C) is a (U,U + V )-code
where dim(U) = kU and |Supp(V )| = n/2?
Theorem 3. The (U,U + V )-distinguishing problem is NP-complete.
We will use the generator matrix point of view to prove this theorem. Recall that a generator
matrix of binary linear code of length n is a matrix G ∈ Fk×n2 with k ≤ n such that:
C = {mG : m ∈ Fk2}.
In other words C consists of all linear combinations of rows of G (they form a generator family
of C). Moreover when G is of full rank the code C has dimension k. The proof that Problem 3 is
NP-complete relies on the NP-completeness of the Three Dimensional Matching problem:
Problem 6 ( 3DM).
Instance: A matrix G3DM ∈ Fs×3t2 where all its rows have a Hamming weight of 3,
Question: Do there exist t rows of G3DM which have pairwise disjoint supports?
Remark 8. Without loss of generality we can always assume for this problem that s ≥ t + 1 and
there are no zero columns in G3DM, otherwise verifying whether the problem has a solution is
straightforward.
Moreover, we are going to use this problem for our reduction by using some tricks taken from
[BGK17, Wie06] (by adding some identity matrices and using minimum distance arguments). The
following fact will be useful for our proof:
Fact 1 Let (c1, · · · , ck) be a basis of a code C. We have
|Supp(C)| ≤
k∑
i=1
|ci|.
Furthermore, |Supp(C)| = ∑ki=1 |ci| ⇐⇒ (ci)1≤i≤k have pairwise disjoint supports.
In order to prove Theorem 3 we introduce an ad-hoc problem, namely
Problem 7 ((U,U + V )-support distinguishing).
Instance: A generator matrix G ∈ Fk×n2 , integers kU and M ,
Question: Is there a permutation matrix P ∈ Fn×n2 such that GP is a generator matrix of
a (U,U + V )-code where dim(U) = kU , |Supp(U)| ≥M and |Supp(V )| = n/2?
It is clearly an NP-problem, the following proposition gives its completeness.
Proposition 13. Problem 7 is NP-complete.
The following lemma will be useful for the proof.
Lemma 8. Let U ( resp. V ) be a code of minimum distance dU ( resp. dV ). The minimum distance
d of the (U,U + V )-code is given by
d = min(2dU , dV ).
Moreover, codewords which achieve this minimum distance necessarily verify one of the following
points:
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1. (u,u) with |u| = dU ,
2. (0,v) with |v| = dV ,
3. (u,0) with |u| = dV ,
4. (u,u + v) with u 6= 0, Supp(u) ( Supp(v) and |v| = dV .
Proof. A (U,U+V )-code contains codewords of the form (u,u) with u ∈ U and (0,v) with v ∈ V ,
therefore d ≤ min(2dU , dV ). Let u ∈ U and v ∈ V be such that (u,u + v) 6= 0. Then if v = 0 we
have |(u,u + v)| = 2|u| ≥ 2dU . Now if v 6= 0 we remark that:
|(u,u + v)| = |u|+ |u + v|
≥ |u|+ |v| − |u| (triangle inequality)
= |v|
≥ dV
then in both cases we have d ≥ min(2dU , dV ) which gives the first result about the minimum
distance of a (U,U + V )-code.
Let (u,u + v) be a codeword of (U,U + V ) such that u 6= 0, v 6= 0, u + v 6= 0 and Supp(u) 6⊆
Supp(v). From |u + v| = |u| − 2|Supp(u) ∩ Supp(v)|+ |v| we deduce:
|(u,u + v)| = 2|u| − 2|Supp(u) ∩ Supp(v)|+ |v| (51)
As Supp(u) 6⊆ Supp(v), we have Supp(u) ∩ Supp(v) ( Supp(u). Therefore thanks to (51):
|(u,u + v)| > |v| > 0
which implies that (u,u + v) cannot achieve the minimum distance as (0,v) ∈ (U,U + V ) which
easily concludes the proof. uunionsq
We are now able to prove Proposition 13.
Proof (Proposition 13). Polynomial time reduction from 3DM to the (U,U +V )-support
distinguishing problem. Let G3DM ∈ Fs×3t2 be an instance of 3DM. Without loss of generality
we can assume that it contains no zero column and that s ≥ t+ 1. Let us now define for integers
p, u:
Ip(u)
4
=
(
Ip · · · Ip
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
u times
∈ Fp×up2
and 0p×u denotes the 0-matrix of size p× u. We now build in polynomial time:
G =
(
It(7) 0t×4(s−t) 0t×(4s+3t)
0s×(4s+3t) Is(4) G3DM
)
∈ F(s+t)×2(4s+3t)2
and we consider the instance
(G, t, 7t)
of the (U,U + V )-support distinguishing problem.
YES-instance of 3DM =⇒ YES-instance of (U,U + V )-support distinguishing. Let us
suppose that G3DM is a YES-instance of 3DM which means there exist t rows which have pair-
wise disjoint supports. This gives the existence of a permutation P1 of size (4s + 3t) such that t
rows of
(
Is(4) G3DM
)
P1 form the matrix
(
It(7) 0t×4(s−t)
)
. Then GP where P is the permutation
matrix P
4
=
(
I4s+3t 04s+3t
04s+3t P1
)
which acts only on the last 4s+ 3t columns, generates a (U,U + V )-
code where U is generated by
(
It(7) 0t×4(s−t)
)
which has dimension t, support of size 7t and V
is generated by
(
Is(4) G3DM
)
P1. As no column of G3DM is equal to 0 we have |Supp(V )| = 4s+3t.
YES-instance of (U,U + V )-support distinguishing =⇒ YES-instance of 3DM. Con-
versely, suppose there exists a permutation matrix P ∈ F2(4s+3t)×2(4s+3t)2 such that GP generates
a code (U,U + V ) where dim(U) = t, |Supp(U)| ≥ 7t and |Supp(V )| = 4s+ 3t.
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Lemma 9. The matrix G generates a code of minimum distance 7. Moreover, the codewords that
achieve the minimum distance are the rows of G.
Proof. The sum of r > 1 rows of
(
Is(4) G3DM
)
(resp.
(
It(7) 0t×4(s−t)
)
) gives a word of weight at
least 4r > 7 (resp. 7r > 7). Moreover, all rows of G have weight 7 which concludes the proof of
this lemma. uunionsq
It directly follows that the minimum distance of the code (U,U + V ) is 7 and therefore, from
Lemma 8, we remark that:
7 = min(2dU , dV )⇒ dV = 7 and dU ≥ 4
where dU (resp. dV ) is the minimum distance of U (resp. V ). This crucial property leads to the
following lemmas which summarizes the structure of the code (U,U + V ) that GP generates.
Lemma 10. For all u ∈ U we have:
(u,0)P−1 is a row of G ⇐⇒ (0,u)P−1 is a row of G
Proof. We know that for all u ∈ U , the codeword (u,u) ∈ (U,U + V ). Therefore it is clear that
for all u ∈ U :
(u,0) ∈ (U,U + V ) ⇐⇒ (0,u) ∈ (U,U + V ).
Moreover, rows of G are the codewords of weight 7 (cf Lemma 9). Then (u,0)P−1 is a row of G
if and only if (0,u)P−1 is a row of G which concludes the proof of this lemma. uunionsq
Lemma 11. There are in G exactly:
– t rows of the form (u,0)P−1 where these u’s form a basis of the code U and |u| = 7,
– t rows of the form (0,u)P−1 where u ∈ U and |u| = 7,
– s− t rows of the form (0,v)P−1 where v ∈ V and |v| = 7 but v /∈ U .
Proof. Lemmas 8 and 9 imply that all rows of G are necessarily of the form with u ∈ U and
v ∈ V :
1. (u,u)P−1 with 2|u| = 7,
2. (0,v)P−1 with |v| = 7,
3. (u,0)P−1 with |u| = 7,
4. (u,u + v)P−1 with Supp(u) ( Supp(v), |v| = 7 and 1 ≤ |u| ≤ 6.
The first case (u,u) is clearly impossible. We are going to show that Case 4 is impossible too.
Let us denote by {(ui,ui + vi)P−1}1≤i≤α (resp. {(u′i,0)P−1}1≤i≤β) the rows which verify Case 4
(resp. 3) where α ∈ J0, (s+ t)K (resp. β ∈ J0, (s+ t)K). We are now going to show that:
{u1, · · · ,uα,u′1, · · · ,u′β} is a basis of U. (52)
Generator Family. As all codewords (u, ∗) (an arbitrary word of the code (U,U +V ) for a fixed
u ∈ U) can be generated, there is a generator family of vectors (u, ∗)P−1 in the generator matrix
G. In this way, as all rows of the form (u, ∗)P−1 with u 6= 0 in G have been considered we have
the result.
Free Family. Let us denote by Li and L
′
j the rows of G which are defined as:
∀i ∈ J1, αK, Li 4=(ui,ui + vi)P−1 ; ∀j ∈ J1, βK, L′j 4=(u′j ,0)P−1.
We remark now that |vi| = 7, therefore by Lemma 9, codewords (0,vi)P−1 are rows of G.
Moreover, by Lemma 10, codewords (0,u′i)P
−1 are rows of G too. Then for each i and j it exists
ki 6= i and lj 6= j such that
∀i ∈ J1, αK, Lki = (0,vi)P−1 6= Li ; ∀j ∈ J1, βK, Llj = (0,u′j)P−1 6= Lj
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are rows of G. In this way let us denote by G˜ the matrix for which we operate the following linear
combination of rows of G:
∀i ∈ J1, αK, Li ← Li + Lki ; ∀j ∈ J1, βK, Lj ← Lj + Llj .
In this way there are α+ β rows in G˜ of the form
{(u1,u1)P−1, · · · , (uα,uα)P−1, (u′1,u′1)P−1, · · · , (u′β ,u′β)P−1}.
Moreover, as Lki 6= Li and Llj 6= Lj for all i and j, the rank of G and G˜ is the same. However
the rank of G is s + t > t and is given by its rows. It follows that the above family is free. Then
codewords
(
(ui), (u
′
j
)
) form a free family which leads to (52) and in particular that α + β =
dim(U) = t.
Thanks to (52) we can apply Fact 1 to the code U :
|Supp(U)| ≤
α∑
i=1
|ui|+
β∑
i=1
|u′i| ≤
α∑
i=1
6 +
β∑
i=1
7 = 6α+ 7β = 6α+ 7(t− α) = 7t− α.
As |Supp(U)| ≥ 7t we have α = 0 which implies that there do not exist exist rows which verify
the fourth case in G and there are in G t rows of the form (u,0)P−1 where codewords u form a
basis of U and are of Hamming weight 7. The t rows (0,u)P−1 directly follow from Lemma 10.
All remaining rows are now of the form (0,v)P−1 with |v| = 7. The case v ∈ U for these words
is impossible otherwise (v,0)P−1 (cf Lemma 10) would be a row of G while we have considered
all rows of this form and this concludes the proof. uunionsq
From the above lemma, there are t rows {(u1,0)P−1, · · · , (ut,0)P−1} in G where the ui’s have a
Hamming weight 7 and form a basis of U . Therefore,
|Supp(U)| ≤
t∑
i=1
|ui| =
t∑
i=1
7 = 7t
and on the other hand we have |Supp(U)| ≥ 7t, which implies that the previous inequality is an
equality. Then by the second assertion of Fact 1, codewords ui’s have pairwise disjoint support
and the 2t rows of G (cf Lemma 10):
{(ui,0)P−1, (0,ui)P−1}1≤i≤t
have pairwise disjoint support. Recall that the matrix G is defined as:
G =
(
It(7) 0t×4(s−t) 0t×(4s+3t)
0s×(4s+3t) Is(4) G3DM
)
∈ F(s+t)×2(4s+3t)2
We remark that the upper part of the matrix has t rows, in this way we have at least t rows of(
0s×(4s+3t)| Is(4) G3DM
)
which have pairwise disjoint supports and this gives the existence of a
matching for G3DM and concludes the proof of Proposition 13. uunionsq
We are now able to prove Theorem 3 by using the NP-completeness of Problem 3. It firstly
relies on the following lemma.
Lemma 12. Let G ∈ Fk×n2 and integers kU ≤ k, M ≤ n/2, we have:
G generates a (U,U + V ) permuted code with |Supp(U)| ≥M and |Supp(V )| = n/2
⇐⇒ G generates a permuted (U,U + V )-code with |Supp(V )| = n/2
and the number of 0 columns in G is smaller than n/2−M.
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Proof. Suppose that G ∈ Fk×n2 generates a permuted (U,U + V )-code. It follows that by the
structure of (U,U + V )-codes there exists a non-singular matrix S ∈ Fk×k2 and a permutation
matrix P ∈ Fn×n2 such that:
SGP =
(
GU GU
0(k−kU )×n/2 GV
)
where GU ∈ FkU×n/22 (resp. GV ∈ F(k−kU )×n/22 ) is a generator matrix of U (resp. V ). Suppose
now that |Supp(V )| = n/2 which means there is no 0-column in GV .
Let us now remark that if |Supp(U)| < M , then there exists at least n/2−M columns which are
equal to 0 in the matrix SGP. Conversely, if there exist n/2−M columns which are equal to 0,
as no column of GV is equal to 0, we necessarily have |Supp(U)| < M .
Multiplication by S−1 and P−1 does not change the number of 0 columns and it easily follows
that we have the same equivalence on G which concludes the proof. uunionsq
Theorem 3 easily follows as we are going to show.
Proof. Let us consider an instance (G, kU ,M) of Problem 3. The polynomial reduction into an
instance of the (U,U + V )-distinguishing is to check if it exists at most n/2 −M columns of G
which are equal to 0, to consider the code generated by G and the integer kU . Then, Lemma 12
is invoked to finish the proof. uunionsq
C.3 Proof of Theorem 4
First it is clear that the weak (U,U + V )-distinguishing problem is in NP. The proof that the
problem is NP-complete relies on the hardness of the subcode equivalence problem [BGK17]:
Problem 8 (subcode equivalence).
Instance: Two linear codes C and D of length n
Question: Is there a permutation σ of the support such that σ(C) ⊆ D
This problem was proved to be NP-complete in [BGK17].
We will show that any instance of the subcode-equivalence problem can be transformed into
an instance of Problem 5 with the same answer. Let us consider an instance (C,D) of the subcode
equivalence problem. We will adopt the generator matrix point of view here which is more conve-
nient for our purpose. In other words, we have access to generator matrices GC and GD of codes
C and D. Let G be the following matrix (
GC 0
0 GD
)
Suppose that there exists a permutation σ such that σ(C) ⊆ D ⇐⇒ C ⊆ σ−1(D). Then if we
apply σ−1 on the last n/2 columns of G we get:(
GC 0
0 σ−1(GD)
)
which generates the code (C|σ−1(D)) which is equal to (C|C+σ−1(D)). Then the code (C,D)4={(c,d) :
c ∈ C, d ∈ D} is a YES instance of Problem 5.
Conversely, suppose that (C,D) is a YES instance of Problem 5. This code has generator
matrix G =
(
GC 0
0 GD
)
and this means that G should generate a permuted (U,U + V ) code with
a permutation which acts only on the second half of the code positions. GC is therefore necessarily
a generator matrix of U . U and C are therefore equal. It also follows that GD (which generates
D) has to generate a permutation of U + V . Since U is a subcode of U + V , it follows that C is a
subcode, up to a permutation, of D. uunionsq
